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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
N uclear R eactor Safety Design Standa rd 
Safety is a very important issue in our lives. It touches every part of our lives, 
from casual things around us like safe toys fo r children and household items, to quite 
complicated things like hospitals and power plants. Even now, new technologies have 
to prove their safety first before they are fully accepted. 
Nuclear facilities where radioactive materials are contained strictly employ the 
principle "safety first"; so that an acceptable balance of risk against benefit can be 
obtained. Most countries have adopted nuclear safety regulations which must be 
complied with by designers , engineers and operators at nuclear facilities. As far as 
radiation protection is concerned, these regulations generally derive from the Rec-
ommendations of t he International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), 
and they rest on three basic principles [l ]: 
1. no practice shall be adopted unless its introduction produces a positive net 
benefit (justification); 
2. all exposures shall be kept As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA), eco-
nomic and social factors being taken into account (optimizat ion); 
3. the dose equivalent to individuals shall not exceed the limits recommended for 
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the appropriate circumstances by the Commission. 
To apply these principles in a nuclear power plant , especially the second principle, 
optimization, a plant designer 's main consideration relates to rout ine operation of 
nuclear facilities. The designer is not specifically concerned with accidents, but , 
of course, s/ he will include consideration of such occurrences. In designing, s/ he 
will take all reasonably practical steps, including where necessary the provision of 
additional plant, to minimize the likelihood and consequences of accidents. This 
involves consideration of the concepts of risk and risk acceptability and a balancing 
of the significance of possible accident situations against the practical safety measures 
which could be envisaged. 
The core of a nuclear power plant , where the fission of uranium or plutonium 
fuel takes place, contains a large amount of radioactivity which needs to be contained 
properly so it will not cause harm to humans and environments around the plant . 
Strict safety procedures are applied to ensure this containment. 
Heat produced in the nuclear fuel fission is removed by the coolant. Fuel over-
heating can occur if the heat production rate increases, exceeding the available heat 
removal capacity, or if the capacity of the heat removal system decreases below that 
required by unforeseen circumstances. There is a clear difference between these two 
phenomena. The first is an unplanned excursion in the reaction rate, and the second 
is a loss of t he coolant from the primary system which is given most attention as a 
"loss of coolant accident" (LOCA) . 
In every nuclear reactor , the fundamental design goal of reactor safety is to 
prevent any transient from leading to damage of the fuel, particularly breaching of 
the fuel cladding or melting of the fuel. To prevent such damage, two main things 
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are required: ( 1) the ability to shutdown the chain reaction rapidly and dependably 
when required, and (2) a cooling system with enough redundancy and capacity to 
remove the heat generated in the reactor core. 
To assure that a nuclear design is safe, the acceptance criteria are based on 
meeting the relevant requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations ( CFR). The 
context in which a judgment on the "safety" of a proposed nuclear power plant is 
made is the review of the Safety Analysis Report which the applicant must submit 
before the construction of the plant and just before it is licensed [2]. The U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) prescribes in detail the information and analysis that 
must be presented in the reports. 
In general, licensing procedures will be as follows [3]: Applicants will have a 
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) prepared and will submit this report as 
part of the application for a construction permit. The regulatory staff will undertake 
a review of the specific application. This staff will send out a large number of written 
questions concerning the PSAR. When the review is almost completed, the staff will 
summarize the findings, including any reservations or unresolved issues. 
The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) will then complete its 
review of the application for the construction permit and submit a public letter to 
the NRC giving its advice and recommendations concerning the application. After 
the ACRS letter has been submitted , an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) 
hearing can proceed and be completed. The ACRS letter will not be a part of the 
ASLB record and the ACRS recommendations need not be followed by the regulatory 
staff or even discussed at the ASLB Hearing. An ASLB Hearing is mandatory at the 
construction permit stage, even if there is no intervention concerning the case. 
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When the construction of a facility is well along, the applicants will submi t 
a Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) as part of its application for an operating 
license. T his repor t will provide more detail on the actual design of the facility 
and will reflect changes made since the PSAR. The regulatory staff will follow a 
similar review procedure as it does earlier for the construction permit. When the 
staff believes it is ready to proceed, it will again issue a safety evaluation report. 
Review by t he ACRS and a public ACRS report on the application for an operati ng 
license will be the next step. However , a public ASLB Hearing is required only if 
there is intervention into the proceedings. 
The criteria and standards that are used in NRC review take a number of forms 
[2]. The fund amental ones , from the point of view of the NRC, are the cri teria t hat 
are contained in Title 10 of the CFR, the title that specifies NRC responsibilities. 
Part 50 of 10 CFR specifies basic standards and requirements for licensing of produc-
tion and utilization facilities; a number of general design criteria, which apply both 
to the routine operational characteristics of reactor systems and to their accident 
response; quality assurance criteria for nuclear power plants and fuel reprocessing 
plants; requirements for emergency plans; and many other basic safety requirements . 
In many cases , the NRC has formulated more detailed "Regulatory Guides,'' which 
specify methods by which the applicant can satisfy these general criteria. Although 
t hese Regulatory Guides do not carry legal force , they serve practically as regulations 
because they turn out to be far the most convenient way to satisfy the NRC. Finally, 
the Regulatory Guides, and indeed the entire safety design review, rests subst antially 
on the voluntary standards that various professional societies have formulated for the 
use of their members and of industry. 
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NRC has published a detailed description in Standard Review Plan (SRP) of 
t he manner in which a review will be done [20]. SRP addresses in detail what is 
reviewed, t he basis for the review, how the review is accomplished, and the nature 
of the conclusions that should be reached [4]. T he first major section of each Review 
Plan, entitled " Areas of Review", describes the scope of review. The second section, 
entitled "Acceptance Criteria,,, states the purpose and technical bases for the review. 
The .. bases" consist of specific criteria such as Atomic Energy Commission ( AEC) and 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guides, General Design Crite-
ria, American Society of Mechani cal Engineers (ASME) Code Requirements , Branch 
Technical Positions or other criteria used in the review. The thi rd section, the' Re-
view P rocedures", discusses how the review is accomplished. This section describes 
the procedures in use for reviewing and approving t he systems, components , data, 
etc., that are described in the first section of the Review Plan, using the criteria 
delineated in the second section. This section is generally a step-by-step procedure 
that the reviewer goes through to provide reasonable verification that the applicable 
safety criteria have been met. The fourt h section, "Evaluation Findings ', presents 
the type of conclusions that are sought regarding the acceptability of the particular 
review area. The final section lists the references utili zed in the review process. 
To help t he licensing process, which needs a lot of literature searching, a com-
puter program is written so that important information needed can be read from this 
program. 
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Role of Computer in Nuclear Fuel Licensing 
Computers are widely used nowadays. In general, the uses of computers can be 
divided into two classes: for numerical computation and for information and data 
storage, ret rieval, processing, and synt hesis [5]. In this thesis, the computer is used 
to store and process information needed in fuel licensing using an expert system shell 
called KnowledgePro. KnowledgePro is a new kind of communications tool. Using 
hypertext and expert systems, it lets the personal computer become a medium to 
communicate ideas and information to others [6]. 
In the early seventies, while computer hardware specialists were developing mi-
crochip technology software specialists were laying t he groundwork for a break-
through in the software area. It was not to invent smaller or faster microchips, 
but to develop computer programs that could in some sense think, solve problems in 
a way that would be considered intelligent if done by a human [7]. This concept is 
known as artificial intelligence (AI ). 
Expert systems are the fruit of AI researches . In the late seventies , AI scientists 
found that the problem-solving power of a program comes from the knowledge it 
possesses. Therefore, to make a program intelligent, it is provided with lots of high-
quality, specific knowledge about some problem area, so the system will be an expert 
in this narrow problem area. Such a program is called an expert system. 
Besides being an expert system, KnowledgePro provides a hypertext system 
which allows users to obtain and store more information when i t is needed. For 
example, "Does LOCA occur?" is understandable for nuclear engineers. People from 
different fields might need more information about LOCA (loss of coolant accident). 
By clicking the mouse button on the hyper text, they will obtain information needed 
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about LOCA which is given only when it is called. 
The combination of hypertext and expert systems which allows the designer to 
store, process and supply information for users is the reason why KnowledgePro is 
chosen to achieve the goal of this thesis. 
Objective 
To make a computer program using the KnowledgeP ro System which will pro-
vide information and procedures needed in the licensing of light-water-cooled power 
reactors (LWRs) . 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Fuel System Design 
According to Standard Review Plan for uclear Power Plants, NUREG-0800 
[20], the fuel system consists of arrays (assemblies of bundles) of fuel rods and re-
activity control rods in a nuclear reactor core. To assu re that there is no release 
of radioactive materials from an operating nuclear reactor core, the shutdown and 
cooling system must be available at all time. Some failures, like limited fuel failures, 
such as the breach of one or a few fuel rods, are acceptable, since there is no mech-
anism for such failures to propagate and lead to large-scale failures . A failure will 
be serious when it occurs in the control or cooling systems; therefore it needs to be 
avoided, whether from a failure that originates in the cooling equipment or from a 
failure (such as an electronic cont rol failure) that leads to a cooling failure . 
When a reactor loses its coolant, large portions of the fuel can quickly lose their 
structural integrity. Cladding, as the first line of defense to contain fission products 
and actinide elements, serves to maintain fuel rod structure. Following the loss of 
coolant in a reactor core is the rise of cladding temperature , which might lead to t he 
melting of fuel cladding if there is no operation of the emergency core cooling system 
(ECCS) . 
If the ECCS fails, the fuel can reach temperatures so high that it melts its 
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way through the reactor vessel and makes its way through the concrete base of the 
containment building. The danger is not only from the fuel escaping from the vessel, 
but also because breach of t he fuel cladding and rise of the fuel temperature can 
cause release of volat ile fission products, especially iodine, cesium, and the noble 
gases. Because of the pressure produced in the fuel element , these radionuclides can 
escape to the environment. 
To avoid such danger , t he main consideration in licensing a reactor core, i.e., 
the fuel and the control and cooling systems, is to ensure that most, if not all, of the 
radioactive materials will be contained well in the fuel element. 
Fuel eleme_nts should be designed to behave in the most favorable manner in the 
unlikely event of a major malfunction, such as a loss of coolant fl.ow or an overpower 
type of accident [8]. Researches have been made to understand the details of fuel 
element changes in a reactor when normally operated or in an accident, to minimize 
the consequences of fuel failure, and to design fail-safe elements. A subtle effect that 
has safety and licensing implications is the change of U02 fuel density that can occur 
in early life. This densification problem initially caused the collapse of cladding and 
unplanned neutron streaming in LWRs. A simple expedient of prepressurizing the 
pins with helium stopped t hat effect. 
Another important process in fuel elements is that when uranium or plutonium 
atoms fission, they produce a range of fission products, especially gases, which will 
influence fuel element behavior. Noble gases xenon and krypton are produced in fair 
abundance. T hese gases can behave in a variety of ways such as remaining in the 
fuel and joining together to form bubbles which cause the fuel to swell , or diffusing 
to t he surface of t he fuel and being released into the sealed cladding and building up 
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pressure. In either case, the cladding experiences a steadily rising pressure , which 
will exceed the external coolant pressure and may cause the cladding to fail. Some 
of the more volatile fission products, such as iodine and cesium, migrate to the 
cooler regions of t he fuel element, i.e. , to the cladding, where they may induce st ress-
corrosion cracking or other degradation phenomena. The discontinuities in the fuel 
surfaces due to pellet-pellet interfaces and to cracks result in locally high st resses on 
the cladding and are favored sites for chemical reactions by fission products. The 
term "pellet-cladding interactions," or P CI , is used to describe these effects in LWR 
fuel elements that are mainly responsible for early failures. 
To avoid the release of radioactive materials from fuel elements, cladding is the 
only barrier to fission products entering the coolant st ream and it must remain intact 
throughout its lifetime. Cladding is restricted in thickness by neutronics and thermal 
stress considerations. However, it must be thick and strong enough to resi st swelling 
and coolant and fission gas pressures. To reduce these pressures, a fuel element is 
designed to have an empty space above or below the fuel. 
There is another consideration in fuel element design. Since fuel elements are 
continuously exposed to radiation , most cladding materials experience a decrease in 
their ductility (radiation embrittlement ). In addition, voids are formed which cause 
differential swelling and hence bowing, and interference stresses which can damage 
the fuel. This encourages the development of cladding and duct materials with low 
swelling rates. The cladding swelling, if uniform, may be advantageous in that it 
reduces or totally removes the fuel- swelling stresses on the cladding because the 
latter is always moving away from the fuel. 
Substantial efforts are expended to prevent failures of the basic reactor systems, 
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particularly of the cooling system [2]. These efforts include conservative design of 
cooling systems and continuous monitoring and inspection to ensure that the systems 
are operable at all times. To assu re that the cooling systems are always available , 
the basic systems are designed with redundancy. In the case that the basic systems 
fail , back up systems are available. These include backup reactivity control systems 
and ECCS. 
Reactivity in a reactor core basically can be controlled using control rods and 
chemical-shim control. The most common control used for quick shutdown is the 
cont rol rod. In general , control rods have a strong neutron absorber like cadmium 
over the full length of the core, and they are used for operational control of the 
reactor , including load following, and fo r quick shutdown (to "trip" or "scram" the 
reactor ). This capability is provided by the fact that the rods can be dropped easily 
into place gravitationally. 
In case that control rods cannot be inserted , liquid neutron absorber (chemical-
shim control ) containing a boron compound may be injected into t he reactor to 
shutdown the chain reaction. Boron does not have long-lived radioactive isotopes, 
so no coolant radioactivity problems arise from it. Besides that , it has been found 
that t he dissolved boron does not increase corrosion rates and that most materials 
suitable in neutral or high pH water at high temperature are also suitable in a boric 
acid solu tion. In addition , it has also been shown that boron does not increase the 
precipitation of corrosion products which would have p osed problems of heat- t ransfer 
surface fouling and radioactivity levels in deposition locations [9]. Because of these 
characteristics, it is safe to use boron solution in a reactor core. 
ECCS is another backup system, designed to operate in the primary system in 
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the event that the coolant inventory decreases. When a LOCA occurs due to small 
leaks , the ECCS should be adequate to overcome the loss. When large breaks occur, 
the sudden release of pressure and the high temperature of the water can result in 
sudden formation of steam and expulsion of the coolant from t he primary system, 
often referred to as blowdown. Under these conditions, injection of water into the 
primary system can be difficult. Even more, t he injected water may not reach the 
hot fuel , so that the temperature rise in the reactor core cannot be alleviated. 
In general, a reactor will have about three ECCS, which operate in distinct and 
independent modes. Usually, two of the systems will operate at low pressure, the 
condition in which most of the coolant has been lost, and one will operate at high 
pressure (with lower fl.ow rates than in at least one of the low-pressure systems). A 
sig~al indicating low coolant level or abnormal pressure is required to activate ECCS, 
except the "accumulator" for the pressurized water reactor (PWR), which consists of 
a large tank of pressurized water that is kept out of the primary system by a check 
valve, which opens if the primary system pressure decreases below the accumulator 
pressure [2]. This is called a "passive" system that does not require an emergency 
signal to initiate operation. 
In a PWR, both the primary coolant system and the various ECCS are enclosed 
by the containment building. Several of its ECCS are intended to cope with a broad 
range of accidents, from minor leakage to a rapid loss of coolant (blowdown). The 
only LOCA that these systems are not designed to cope with is a catastrophic rupture 
of the reactor vessel, in which case there is no system to hold water [2]. 
When a break occurs in the primary coolant system, it will cause drops in the 
primary system pressure. If the pressure drops to much below 1000 psi (7 MPa), the 
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accumulators will act with no delay to inject fluid into either the reactor vessel or t he 
cold legs depending on break location. In case of small breaks that do not greatly 
reduce the pressure, high pressure injection systems will provide makeup water, which 
is usually injected into a hot or cold leg [2]. 
In a boiling water reactor (BWR), a network of syst ems, which depend on signals 
indicating low water level in the pressure vessel or high pressure in the dry well , or 
both, perform specific ECCS functions to cope with LOCAs. The systems include 
high-pressure core spray to lower the pressure within the pressure vessel, provide 
makeup water in the event of LOCA, and cool the fuel assemblies in the event of an 
uncovered core. Relief valves are used to depressuri ze the reactor by blowing down 
the vessel contents into the drywell; following this step, low-pressure core spray is 
used to cool the fuel assemblies. The water supply for any of these systems is the 
suppression pool , which is also where reactor coolant losses should flow , so that a 
closed loop should exist. 
The acceptance criteria for emergency core cooling system for light water nuclear 
power reactors can be found in §50.46, 10 CFR Part 50. Also ECCS evaluation models 
can be found in Appendix K , 10 CFR Part 50. 
Expert System 
The process of building an expert system is often called knowledge engineering 
[7]. This process will involve human experts, and expert-syst em builder , called the 
knowledge engineers , who will "extract" from the human experts their procedures, 
strategies, and rules of thumb for problem solving, and build this knowledge into the 
expert system, as shown in Figure 2.1 [7] below. The result is a computer program 
DOMAIN 
EXPERT 
queries, problems 
answers, solutions 
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KNOWLEDGE 
ENGINEER 
strategies, 
rules-of-thumb, 
domain rules 
Figure 2.1: Knowledge engineering 
EXPERT 
SYSTEM 
that solves problems in much t he same manner as the human experts would do. 
Expert systems offer some advantages compared to human expert s. They are 
summarized in Table 2.1 below [7]. Seeing these advantages might raise a question: 
Table 2.1: The advantages of expert system s 
Human experts 
Perishable 
Difficult to transfer 
Difficult to document 
Un predictable 
Expensive 
Exper t systems 
Permanent 
Easy to transfer 
Easy to document 
Consistent 
Affordable 
why not eliminate human experts, and replace them with expert systems? Of course 
there are some disadvantages of expert system s, in which human experts are clearly 
superior to the artificial systems. They are summarized in Table 2.2 [7]. 
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Table 2.2: T he disadvantages of expert systems 
Human experts 
Creative 
Adaptive 
Sensory experience 
Broad focus 
Expert systems 
Uninspired 
Common sense knowledge 
Needs to be told 
Symbolic input 
Narrow focus 
Technical knowledge 
Expert systems are different from conventional programs in many ways. T he 
basic difference is that conventional programs manipulate data, while expert systems 
manipulate knowledge. Thus, the conventional programs are designed to produce 
the correct and precise answer every time (an algorithm) , and when they produce 
incorrect answers , the programs must be debugged. Expert systems are designed to 
behave like human experts, who sometimes produce correct answers and sometimes 
do not. Table 2.3 [21] summarizes differences between conventional programs and 
expert systems. 
Table 2.3: The differences between conventional programs and expert systems 
Conventional programs 
Representations and use of data 
Algorit hmic 
Repetitive process 
Effective manipulation of large data 
bases 
Expert systems 
Representation and use of knowledge 
Heuristic 
Inferential process 
Effective manipulation of large knowledge 
bases 
There a re some common ways to represent knowledge in exper t systems: seman-
tic networks, frames, scripts, and production systems [10]. 
A semantic network focuses on the graphical representation of relations be-
tween elements in a domain. A semanti c network consists of points called nodes 
connected by links called arcs describing the relations between the nodes. The most 
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common relations used in semantic networks are is a and partof relations. The 'isa ' 
link is used to represent the fact that an element is a member of a class of elements 
that have a collection of distinguishing properties in common. For example, the 
following net represents the fact t hat a nuclear power plant is a type of power plant : 
nuclear power plant - isa ______. power plants 
The following net represents the fact that a control rod 1s a part of a nuclear 
power plant: 
control rod - partof ___.. nuclear power plant 
T hese network fragments can be combined to form one net : 
cont rol rod 
partof 
nuclear power plant - isa - power plants 
Reasoning based on semantic nets is generally straightforward because associa-
tions can be made simply by tracing the linkages in the system [10]. For example, 
we can apply linkage inference to the following simple net and conclude that 63 is 
greater than : 
63 - is greater ______. 12 - is greater --.... 8 
A frame is a network of nodes and relations organized in a hierarchy, where the 
topmost nodes represent general concepts and the lower nodes more specific instances 
of those con cepts [7]. It is a structure for organizing knowledge with an emphasis 
on default knowledge in order to imitate the important human ability to interpret 
new situations on the basis of knowledge gained from experience in similar situations . 
This abili ty allows our knowledge to grow with each experience rather than star t from 
the ini ti al condi tions in every case [10]. For example, based on past experience, NucE 
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students will expect that N ucE lectures will be held in a class room in a particular 
building, with duration around 50 minutes, and that the class will start not more 
than a few minutes after the time given in the class schedule . These are students ' 
expectations regarding N ucE lectures, the thing that, unless there is evidence to the 
contrary, they expect to be true of all N ucE lectures. We maintain large mental 
collections of knowledge structures that include these expectations as default values 
for the corresponding characteristics. 
The key idea involved in frames is that our knowledge of con cepts, events, and 
situations is organized around expectations of key features of those situations [11]. 
These expectations can be encoded in a generic "lecture frame" to be modified by 
what actually occurs during a specific lecture. This frame will include various slots, 
where specific values can be entered to describe the example above such as slots for 
location, equipment, etc. Some of these slots have default values at which actual 
values are likely to be found. Slots in one frame may contain references to other 
frames, thus linking them together into frame systems. 
Figure 2.2 gives an illust ration of how NucE Lectures and a certain lecture, i.e. , 
NucE 551 Lecture will be presented in frames. "NucE Lecture" frame has slots for 
room location, start time, duration, equipment , their ranges, and their default values. 
This frame describes all NucE lectures in general. While "NucE 551 Lecture" frame, 
which describes a specific lecture, has slots with actual values only. 
A script , which is a specialization of the general concept of a frame, is a structure 
that is used to store prototypes of expected sequences of events [10]. These expec-
tations are based on our observation of recurring patterns in the events of similar 
situations that we have observed in the past. 
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NUCE LECTURE FRAME 
Specialization of: NucE Lecture 
Room location: 
Range: RI42, R137, R139 
Default: R 142 
Start time: 
Range: 0800, 0900, 1000, IlOO, 1310, 1410, 1510, 1610 
Default: 0800 
Duration: 
Range: 50 minutes to 90 minutes 
Default: 50 minutes 
Equipment: 
Range: overhead projector, blackboard, video player, computer terminal, 
slide projector 
Default: blackboard, overhead projector 
NUCE 551 LECTURE 
Specialization of: NucE 551 Lecture 
Room location: R 142 
Start time: 0800 
Figure 2.2: Frames for " N ucE Lecture" and "N ucE 551 Lecture" 
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Many different components can be used to construct a script. Some of the most 
common include: 
• Entry conditions. The conditions that must exist for the script to be appli-
cable. 
• Script results . Conditions that will be true after the events in the script have 
occurred. 
• Props. Slots that represent objects that are involved in the script. 
• Roles. Slots that represent agents (e.g., people) that perform actions in the 
script. 
• Scenes. Specific sequences of events that make up the script . 
Figure 2.3 shows a script that represents the process of attending a class for a student. 
Once we have a script that models the existing conditions, we can use the scenes 
to infer the existence of unobserved events. For example, considering the script of 
Figure 2.3, if we observe that t he student left because the class was cancelled, we can 
infer t hat s/ he must have been informed about that. This type of reasoning is not, 
however, equally reliable for predicting future events on the basis of a scene. The fact 
that a student is in the class does not necessarily imply that s/ he will concentrate on 
the lecture. T he student may daydream in the class. 
Knowledge representation using a production system is the most popular tech-
nique. A production system is a meaits of codifying rule-based knowledge [11]. A 
rule is a piece of knowledge, one thing the program has to know [12]. It is called a 
rule because things to know often are of the form: 
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ATTENDING A CLASS SCRIPT 
Props: classroom, blackboard, chalk, overhead projector, transparencies, 
marker pens 
Roles: student, lecturer 
Point of view: student 
Event of sequence: 
l. enter classroom 
2. sit down unless the class is cancelled then exit room 
3. concentrate on the lecture 
4. pack up 
5. exit classroom 
Main concept: 3 
Figure 2.3: An attending class script 
if < circumstances > 
then < do action, or conclude something> 
Similar to human problem solving, a production system has three parts which 
are analogous to the knowledge states , mental operations , and decision making: 
1. a working memory: a database of facts that represents what the system "knows" 
about the problem at any one moment; 
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2. a rulebase: a set of production rules that operates on those facts; 
3. an interpreter that examines the current state and executes applicable produc-
tion rules. 
The rulebase contains the IF-THEN operations that change states of knowledge. 
These IF-THEN operate in a different manner from "if ... then ... " statements in a 
programming language. Each rule represents an independent "chunk" of knowledge 
which can be initiated, or fired, when the entire condition matches items in working 
memory [11]. Once the rule is fired, its actions are carried out, which usually (but 
not always) involves removing facts that are no longer true from working memory 
and adding new facts that have become true. Various actions that can be done by 
the rules are: 
make 
remove 
compute 
read 
write 
add a new element to global memory 
delete an element from global memory 
calculate a value from specified variables 
accept input from the user 
provide output to t he user 
The interpreter generally operates repeatedly in t he following steps: 
1. Match: find the rules whose conditions are satisfied by the current contents of 
working memory. 
2. Conflict resolution: decide which rule to use. If the condition part of none of 
the productions is satisfied , then halt the interpreter. 
FACTS 
E 
match 
c 
B 
C & D -> F 
A-> D 
RULES 
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FACTS 
E 
B 
maLch 
C & D -> F 
A-> D 
RULES 
Figure 2.4: Forward chaining 
3. Act: perform the actions in the rule's body. 
4. Go to step 1. 
FACTS 
E 
G 
F 
B 
There are two important ways in which rules can be used in a product ion system, 
i.e. , forward chaining and backward chaining [7]. A forward chaining is a n inference 
method where rules are matched against facts to establish new facts. Figures 2.4 and 
2.5 show an example of forward chaining and its inference chain. 
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A----
Figure 2.5: Inference chain produced by example in Figure 2.4 
Figure 2.4 shows how a production system will get a final result from the system's 
facts and rules. The system has these rules: A - D; and C & D - F . In its working 
memory, the system has these facts: A, E, H, G , C, and B. 
The first rule that fires is A -. D because A is already in the working memory. 
The existence of D is inferred, and D is placed in the working memory. This causes 
the second rule C & D --+ F to fire , and now F is in the working memory. The 
inference chain produced is shown in Figure 2.5. 
A backward chaining is an inference method where the system starts with what 
it wants to prove, e .g., F , and tries to establish t he facts it needs to prove F. Figure 
2.6 shows an example of backward chaining. 
Figure 2.6 shows t hat in step 1 t he system checks if F exists in the working 
memory. When it does not, then the system sear ches for the rule that concludes with 
Fon the right side of the arrow, i.e., C & D ____. F. In step 2 till 5, the system finds 
C in the working memory but decides it must establish A before it can conclude D. 
A is found in t he working memory, so D is inferred and put in the working memory. 
FACTS 
need to 
~ wantF 
get C get D 
C & D -> F 
A-> D Fhere 
RULES 
FACTS 
Q step s 8 have A 
C & D -> F 
A-> D 
RULES 
FACTS 
wantC 
c:illJ D 
RULES 
FACTS 
C & D-> F 
A -> D 
RULES 
step 6 
have C 
have D 
FACTS 
need to 
t 
getA 
C & D -> F 
A -> D 
RULES 
~ 
RULES 
Figure 2.6: Backward chaining 
FACTS 
E 
want D 
want A 
D here lli:1J D 
RULES 
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Finally, since C and D are in the working memory, F is established. 
KnowledgePro which is used in this thesis basically is a communication tool, or 
a language. It can be used in many different kinds of structures , also in a rule-based 
application. This is appropriate to achieve the object ive of this thesis. A production 
system using forward chaining was used to accomplish the objective of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3. PROGRAMMING 
Programming in KnowledgePro System 
To provide information and procedures needed in the licensing of fuel for Eght 
water reactors using KnowledgePro System, variables which are called "topics" are 
used. A topic is a subject or a theme, a "piece of knowledge" [6]. 
In KnowledgePro System, topics are able to perform a variety of functions such 
as to: 
1. contain commands like a procedure, 
2. store values like a variable, 
3. return values like functions, 
4. be assigned properties like frames, 
5. inherit values, 
6. behave like system commands , 
7. be threaded to hypertext , 
8. be arranged hierarchically. 
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In this thesis, topics mostly are used to store information and contain procedure. 
Topics can be defined in any order that a programmer desires. Only their level 
of nesting within other topics will have significance. If two topics are defined with 
the same name and level of nesting, only the later defined topic is used. 
Since order of topics is not significant , it is important to understand how Knowl-
edgePro searches for a topic so a program can be run effectively. A topic will be 
searched for: 
1. in the current topic, 
2. in the parent of the current topic, 
3. in the siblings of the parent of the current topic, 
4. in the parent of the parent, 
and so on until !main is reached. (!main is a topic which is created when a Knowl-
edgePro application is used. All other topics are descendants of !main.) Figure 3.1 
will give fur th er explanation about this search. It is important to remember that 
search always proceeds up and out, never down into lower hierarchical levels. This 
means that when siblings of parents are searched the search does not continue down 
inside topics belonging to the siblings. If the search is unsuccessful, the topic is either 
created as a child of !main or, if the search was caused by a value_of command, an 
error message is displayed saying that the topic could not be found. 
From Figure 3.1, when t he statement "do (ABC)", where AB C is a topic , is 
encountered in the topic leveL3, the system will search to see if the topic already 
exist before it creates a new one. The topic "ABC" will be searched first in the 
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topic level_O. 
topic level_ l a. 
topic level_2a. 
topic level_3. 
do (ABC). 
end. (*level_3*) 
end. (*level_2a*) 
topic level_2b. 
end. (*level_2b*) 
end. (* level l a*) 
topic level_lb. 
topic level_l ba. 
end. (* level_lba*) 
end. (*level_lb*) 
end. (*level_O*) 
Figure 3.1: A hierarchy of topics 
current topic. When it is not found , then it is searched in the parent topic, and so 
on until !main is reached. This order of searching is well described as follows: 
leveL3 , leveL2a. leveL2b , leveLla, 
leveLlb, leveLO , !main 
LeveLlba is never examined since it is inside a si bling. 
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Application 
Information provided in this program is taken from NUREG-0800 [20] Section 
4.2 Fuel System Design, Section 4.3 Nuclear Design, and Section 4.4 Thermal and 
Hydrauli c Design. Information is arranged in this program in such a way that a user 
can read the information through t he Content or Index choice in the Opening Menu. 
In general , Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for 
Nuclear Power Plants , NUREG-0 00 in Sections 4.2, 4.3 , and 4.4 contains: 
1. Areas of Review 
A. For Section 4.2 Fuel System Design, this part of DREG- 0800 has ob-
jectives to provide assurance that (a) the fuel system is not damaged as 
a result of normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences, (b ) 
fuel system damage is never so severe as to prevent control rod insertion 
when i t is required , (c) the number of fuel rod failures is not underesti-
mated for postulated accidents , and ( d) coolability is always maintained. 
B. For Section 4.3 Nuclear Design, a review of the nuclear design of the 
fuel assemblies , control systems, and reactor core is carried out to aid 
in confirming that fuel design limit will not be exceeded during normal 
operation or anticipated operational transients, and that the effects of 
postulated reactivity accidents will not cause significant damage to the 
reactor coolant pressure boundary or impair the capability to cool the 
core and to assure conformance with the requirements of General Design 
Criteria 10-13 , 20, and 25-28. 
C . For Section 4.4 Thermal and Hydraulic Design, the objectives of the review 
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are to confirm that the thermal and hydraulic design of the core and the 
reactor coolant system (RCS) has been accomplished using acceptable 
analytical methods. 
2. Acceptance Criteria 
For each section, the acceptance criteria are based on meeting the relevant 
requirements of General Design Criteria ( GDC) related to each section and 
also other requirements mentioned in Code of Federal Regulations ( CFR) . 
3. Review Procedures 
The review should assure that the design bases meet the acceptance criteria. 
4. Evaluation Findings 
In this part , the reviewer should verify that sufficient information has been 
provided to satisfy the requirements of certain sections and that the evalution 
supports conclusions to be included in the staff 's safety evaluation report. 
5. Implementation 
The following is intended to provide guidance to applicants and licensees re-
garding the NRC staff 's plan for using certain sections. Except in those cases 
for which the applicant proposes an acceptable alternative method for com-
plying with specified portions of the Commission 's regulations, the method 
described herein will b e used by the staff in its evaluation of conformance with 
Commission regulations. 
6. References 
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opening menu 
I 
content index 
! ! 
choice choice 
Figure 3.2: Flow-chart 
To write this program, a flow-chart as shown in Figure 3.2 was used. The pro-
gram will allow the user to use the procedures and information provided in NUREG-
0800 step by step from the beginning following Content choice in the program, or 
if s/ he wants to pick up a certain part or information, s/ he can click on certain 
choices in Content or Index choice. The program is meant to be user friendly, so 
users without strong background in computation still can use the program easily. All 
information or procedures needed to use the program can be read on t he screen. and 
users only need to click mouse's button to execute them. 
As mentioned before, information and procedures needed in licensing of fuel for 
light water reactors will be provided in topics. To organize information so that it can 
be called easily, this program was designed as is shown in Figure 3.3 (this figure can 
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!main 
Opening Menu. (which contains menu i.e., Content and Index) 
Content. 
Index. 
Information. 
Figure 3.3: Topics ' organization 
also be seen when the program is run using F6 key on the computer keyboard ). 
A topic called Opening Menu will offer a menu consisting of topic Content and 
Index which are two short sets of commands which function as drivers of the whole 
program. Information is provided in other topics which have the same level in hier-
archy of topics. so when a topic is called in the children level of Content or Index, it 
can be found easily according to search order in KnowledgePro System. 
The program was written in rule-based manner . Commands frequently used in 
the KnowledgePro System are: 
1. ask to ask a question 
2. say to display a message on the screen 
3. if... then... to test conditions and perform actions 
4. do to perform a topic 
- # ' J . m .... rr: m to begin or end marked text (hypertext ). 
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An example of how these commands are used is given in F igure 3.4. It is from 
the program wri tten for this thesis, from the 'index1' part to find a topic "acceptance 
criteria". (A complete explanation how this program works is shown in Result part 
of this chapter) 
This part of t he program is written to accommodate a user who wants to read 
information connected with acceptance cri teria written in index part of the pro-
gram. The flow is such that when the user clicks on the desired choice, in this case 
acceptance c ri teria , t he program will respond by offering a menu containing choices 
of information where s/ he can find this topic. Here the user can get the information 
s/ he wants by clicking his mouse button on the choice s/ he wants. After that, if 
s/ he wants to see some more information under the same topic there will be a short 
section of the program called "follow" which meets this need. This topic "follow" 
also contains choices to go back to Content or Index. 
In NUREG-0 00, the topic "acceptance criteria" can be found in topics : "4.2.II 
Acceptance Criteria in Fuel System Design", "4.3.II Acceptance Cri teria in Nuclear 
Design", and "4.4.II Acceptance Criteria in Thermal and Hydrauli c Design" . These 
three topics connected with "acceptance criteria", in a production system, are located 
in working memory. T he topic "acceptance criteria' , which has some rules in it , is 
called the rule base. The interpreter-like component is under the topic "follow" to 
offer the user t he follow-up steps s/ he can do. 
Result 
A result of t hi s programming is a package of procedures and information based 
on NUREG-0 00, Sections 4.2 - 4.4. To use the program, a user needs only to click 
topic 'acceptance criteria '. 
ask (' 
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You can find topic "Acceptance Criteria" in : 
(please click on your choice)', click, 
'Acceptance Criteria m Fuel System Design ' , 
'Acceptance Criteria in Nuclear Design', 
'Acceptance Criteria in Thermal and Hydraulic Design']). 
if ?click is ' Acceptance Criteria in Fuel System Design ' 
I.hen do ('4.2. II Acceptance Criteria ') and do (fo llow) 
else if ?click is 'Acceptance Criteria in Nuclear Design' 
I.hen do ('4.3. Il Acceptance Criteria') and do (follow) 
else if ?click is 'Acceptance Criteria in Thermal and 
Hydraulic Design ' 
I.hen do ('4.4.II Acceptance Criteria ' ) and do (follow). 
end. 
topic 'follow'. 
ask (' 
What would you like to see next?', next 
'Other choices under I.he same topic ', 
'Content', 
' Index']). 
If ?next is 'Other choices under I.he same topic' 
I.hen do (?choice) 
e lse do (?next). 
end. 
Figure 3.-1 : Example of prog ramming in KnowledgePro System 
35 
on one of the choices available on the screen. 
In the beginning, a user will be offered two choices: to see the Conte n t or the 
Index . This menu permits a user to get the information s/ he wants. Figure 3.5 
shows how this part is shown on the computer screen . In this figure, the Content 
nowledgePr·<L----------------------------1 
What would you like to see? 
Figure 3.5: Opening menu 
Conte nt 
Index 
choice is highlighted . which means that the cursor is in this choice. To get to t he 
choice that a user wants, s/ he can use the mouse to position the cursor, or F3 key. 
The F3 key lets users move the cursor forward , while s hift F3 key will bring the 
cursor backward. When the cursor is already on the choice that a user wants , s/ he 
can click on the mouse button or press the F4 key to execute the choice. 
To continue the presentation of t his program. it is taken that Conten t choice 
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CONTENT 
(please click on your choice) 
4.2 Fuel System Design 
4.2.I Areas of Review 
4.2.1.A Design Bases 
4.2.1.B Description and Design Drawings 
4.2.1.C Design Evaluation 
4.2.1.D Testing, Inspection, and Surveillance Plans 
4.2.II Acceptance Criteria 
4.2.11.A Design Bases 
4.2. II .A.1 Fuel System Damage 
4.2. II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failw·e 
4.2.II.A.3 Fuel Coolability 
<page 1of3> 
Figure 3.6: Content menu 
is chosen. This step activates the topic associated with Content in the program. and 
presents a menu as shown in Figure 3.6. 
Again here , a user can use the mouse or F3 and F4 keys to get the choice s/ he 
wants. Since Content has a long list of choices. a user needs to use P g U p and 
Pg Dn keys to see other pages of choices. 
Besides the choices offered on the sc reen , KnowledgePro System has built-in 
choices which a re shown in the bottom of the sc reen . Some of these choices are to 
edit. to display the hierarchical st ructure of the topics. to exit to DOS . to get help 
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about how to use the system, and to quit. These choices are activated using function 
keys which are available on the keyboard. 
A user can pick on any section s/ he wants to read in the Content menu. If the 
user wants to read all of the material in order from Section 4.2 - 4.4 of NUREG-0800, 
there will be a menu at the end of any choice shown in Content menu, so that s/ he 
does not need to go back to Content menu every time. In case the user wants to 
read a certain topic, and then jump to another topic, there will be a menu offering 
Content choice at the end of every part, so s/ he can go back to Content to get the 
topics/ he wants. An example of this menu is shown in Figure 3.7, after a user clicks 
on the 4.2 .II.A D esign Bases choice. 
In this example, if a user wants to continue reading the continuation of part 
4.2.II.A Design Bases, s/ he can click on the choice of 4.2.II.A. 1 Fuel System 
D amage. Or s/ he can skip that part, and go to another choice; for example, s/ he 
can go to I ndex choice. 
In I ndex choice, a user will be offered choices that will permit him to get infor-
mation from selected keywords found in Sections 4.2 - 4.4 of NUREG-0800. In this 
example, as shown in Figure 3.8, a user was interested in getting information about 
acceptance cri teria , so s/ he moved the cursor to this choice in Index menu, and 
clicked on it. 
After clicking on acceptance criteria choice, the user is offered some choices 
where s/ he can find topic "acceptance criteria" in this program. If there is only one 
choice, it will be shown right away, and after that the user will be offered a menu of 
follow-up steps. For example, this time the user wanted to read all the information, 
starting from the first choice, so s/ he clicked on Acceptance C r iteria in Fuel 
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now ledge 
4.2.11.A Design Bases 
The fuel system design bases must reflect the four objectives described 
in subsection I, Areas of Review. To satisfy these objectives, acceptance 
criteria are needed for fuel system damage, fuel rod failure, and fuel 
coolability. These criteria are discussed in the following: 
(please click on your choice) 
4.2.II.A.1 Fuel System Damage 
4.2.II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure 
4.2.II.A.3 Fuel Coolability 
Content 
Index 
Figure 3. 7: An example of menu offered to continue reading the information 
System D esign on menu shown in Figure 3.9. Figure 3.10 shows the information 
shown on the screen following user's clicking on the mouse button. 
If, in the example above, t he user finally decided to see topic "acceptance cri-
teria" from the menu, s/ he would get into Section 4.2.II Acceptance Criteria of 
NUREG-0800. as it is shown in Figure 3.10. When t he user is done with t hi s read-
ing, s/ he can continue t he reading by pressing Space Bar to activate a topic called 
"Follow" which will offer a menu as is shown in Figure 3.11. 
In Figure 3.10 , it also can be seen that some part of the text is highlighted. This 
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INDEX 
(please click on your choice) 
acceptance criteria 
accident 
audit 
ballooning 
blockage 
bowing 
bursting 
calculation 
ECCS performance 
thermal behavior 
thermal margin 
<page 1of7> 
Figure 3.8: Index menu 
is the one which is called "hypertext" in previous part of this thesis. The information 
contained in this text can be read by clicking the mouse button after positioning the 
cursor on the desired text. If a mouse is not available, users can use F3 key to move 
the cursor forward, Shift F3 key to move the cursor backward, and then use F4 key 
to activate the hypertext. 
The explanation contained in a hypertext will be written in a different window. 
Figure 3.12 shows what is presented on the computer screen when the user clicked 
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You can find topic 'Acceptance Criteria' in: 
(please click on your choice) 
Acceptance Criter ia in F uel System Design 
Acceptance Criteria in Nuclear Design 
Acceptance Criteria in Thermal and Hydraulic Design 
Figure 3.9: An example of finding a topic in Index menu 
on G ener a l D esign Criteria 10 as it is shown in Figure 3.10. 
After reading information in hypertext, when a user wants to go back to the 
previous window. in this case to Figure 3.10, he needs only to press "Space Bar" , 
and the window which has information for the hypertext will disappear. When the 
window is not big enough to write all information it has , in the bot tom of the window 
a note will be shown which will remind the user to use "Pg Up" and "Pg Dn" keys 
to get all hidden information in hypertext. 
From Figure 3.11, when the Other choice under the same topic choice is 
clicked, the user will be given the menu shown in Figure 3.9, so s/ he can continue 
reading information under the same topic , i.e. , "Acceptance Criteria in Nuclear De-
sign" and "Acceptance Criteria in Thermal and Hydraulic Designr. 
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4.2.II Acceptance Criteria 
Specific criteria necessary to meet the requirement of 10 CFR 50, 
General Design Criteria 10, 17, and 35, Appendix K to CFR 
Part 50; ... 
(please press Space to continue) 
Figure 3.10: An example of hypertext 
KnowledgePro System also permits the use of hypertext in the windows. This 
gives more chance for programmers to "hide" information which might interest only 
certain readers. When a hypertext written in a window is activated , another window 
will be shown on the screen to write the information contained in this hypertext. 
These hypertext windows will disappear one by one from the latest one when the 
user presses the space bar. 
What would you like to see next? 
(please click on your choice) 
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Other choices under the same topic 
Content 
Index 
Figure 3.11: Menu in topic "Follow" 
Specific criteria necessary to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, 
General Criteria 10, 27, and 35; Appendix Kto 10 CFR Part 50; 
Criterion 10 - Reactor Design 
The reactor core and associated coolant, control, and protection 
systems shall be designed with appropriate margin to assure that 
specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded during 
any condition of normal operation, including the effects of 
anticipated operational occurrences. 
Figure 3.12: An example of a window for hypertext 
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CHAP TER 4. CONCLUSION 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the objective of this thesis is to write a pro-
gram using KnowledgePro System to facilitate licensing of light water reactors. This 
objective was accomplished in a program as provided in the Appendix B. The program 
was written using the KnowledgePro System shell in a forward chaining production 
system. 
The program will benefit plant engineers and others who are interested in light 
water reactor licensing by providing relevant information and procedures, so they 
do not need to search through as many literature references as would otherwise be 
necessary. The program is written as a user friendly program, so even a user without 
any computer skill or background can use it by following the directions provided on 
the screen. 
Though the program has provided necessary licensing information and proce-
dures, it is not a final product that can be solely relied upon in a licensing process. 
A lot of information, especially technical ones , is not available in this program yet. 
This information can be added easily to the program, or it can be kept in a separate 
file and be called by the program using "load" command. Both approaches have 
disadvantages. If the additional information is added directly to the program, the 
program becomes big, and more difficult to debug. On the other hand, this approach 
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has one distinct advantage, i.e., easy access to information so the information can be 
obtained right away when it is needed. If the information is kept in a separate file, 
it has the advantage of being easier to program and to debug. But it will take time 
to access the information and present it to the user. 
If this program is to be developed to be a complete guide for licensing, it is 
necessary to communicate with the NRC so the information and procedures in the 
program will be current . Besides that , the program needs a safety feature so that its 
contents cannot be altered by an unauthorized person. 
It is beneficial to write a program in KnowledgePro System, because the com-
mands and the logic are simple. The only disadvantage found while programming 
in KnowledgePro System was its inability to edit programs larger than 150 kbytes. 
Many times the system failed to save such a file and the final result of editing could 
not be saved . To solve this problem the program was written in Wordstar as a non-
document file, then loaded to KnowledgePro System. Another solution would be to 
break the program into some smaller programs. This method has the disadvantage 
of longer execution time, and so it was not chosen for this project. 
Although programming in KnowledgePro System is easy because the commands 
are used in daily language (ask , say, do, etc.), it has to be done carefully. When a 
notation like ","," ." , or "1" is missed, it will adversely affect the whole program. 
These mistakes sometimes cannot be found easily because the error message given 
during compilation of the program does not show the exact location of the mistake. 
Moreover , if the programmer ignores the error message, the compilation will continue, 
and the program might be able to execute, but it will not give the correct result. 
One important thing to remember in KnowledgePro System is the hierarchy of 
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the topics. This is because of the way KnowledgePro System searches a topic. It is 
important to make sure that a desired topic is not hidden in an unaccessible location. 
Another important thing is not to give the same name to two or more topics in the 
same level of nesting , because only the latter defined topic is used. 
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APPENDIX A . PROGRAM MANU AL 
To start using The Licensing of Fuel for Light-water-cooled Power Reactors Pro-
gram, a user should follow this procedure: 
1. change the directory into KnowledgePro directory (in Computer Laboratory 
of Nuclear Engineering Laboratory it is done by choosing KnowledgePro in 
network). 
2. type KP to start KnowledgePro System. 
3. choose topic 'License' in the KnowledgePro System choices by moving cursor 
to this choice, and then click your mouse but ton on your choice. 
4. follow the inst ruction in the program to get the wanted information. 
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APPENDIX B. COMPUTER PROGRAM 
do ('Opening Menu'). 
topic 'Opening Menu' . 
ask (' 
Computer- based Handbook 
for the Licensing of Light Water Reactors 
by 
Maria Adiartsi Hendrawarsita 
under the supervision of 
Dr. Monroe S. Wechsler 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
This program has been developed to provide information and procedures 
needed in the licensing of light - water- cooled power reactors (LWRs). 
Sources of Information: 
1. Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports 
for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition. USNRC Report NUREG- 0800. 
1981. 
2. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A. General Design Criteria for Nuclear 
Power Plants . 
3. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K. ECCS Evaluation Models. 
4. 10 CFR Part 50, & 50 . 46 . Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core 
Cooling Systems for Light Water Nuclear Power Reactors. 
5. 10 CFR Part 100. Reactor Site Criteria. 
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This program is menu based and to search through this you can use 
either a mouse or keys on your keyboard. 
If you are using a mouse, position the cursor on the page count at the 
bottom of the screen and use the left button to move up a page and the 
right button to move down a page. To select a choice from the menu, you 
can just move the cursor to the choice and click on the left button. You 
can also do this with the Hypertext and the system menu at the bottom of 
the screen. Hypertext contains more information on a highlighted topic 
and this is displayed when the topic is selected. 
When you do not have a mouse, use the arrow keys to highlight the choice 
in the menu and hit the Enter/ Return key to execute. If you are viewing 
information extending over a screenful, use the PgUp/ PgDn keys to read the 
entire section. To select any of the system menus, hit the appropriate 
function key as shown at the bottom of the screen. To select Hypertext, 
use F3 key to move from one highlighted text to the next. Shift-F3 will 
take you back to the previous highlighted text . To execute a particular 
Hypertext selection use the F4 key. 
What would you like to see? ' , want, 
[ 
Content, 
Index, 
'Opening Menu']). 
do (?want). 
topic 'Content ' . 
ask (' 
CONTENT 
(please click on your choice)',choice, 
[ 
'4 .2 Fuel System Design', 
' 4.2.I Areas of Review' , 
'4.2.I.A Design Bases', 
'4.2. I.B Description and Design Drawings', 
' 4.2.I.C Design Evaluation ' , 
'4 .2.I .D Testing, Inspection, and Surveillance Plans', 
'4.2.II Acceptance Criteria', 
'4.2.II.A Design Bases', 
' 4.2.II.A.1 Fuel System Damage ' , 
' 4.2.II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure ' , 
'4.2.II.A.3 Fuel Coolability', 
'4.2. II.B Description and Design Drawings ' , 
' 4.2.II.C Design Evaluation ' , 
'4.2.II.C.1 Operating Experience' , 
'4.2.II.C.2 Prototype Testing', 
'4.2 .II .C . 3 Analytical Predictions ' , 
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'4.2 .II.D Testing, Inspection, and Surveillance Plans', 
'4 . 2.II.D.1 Testing and Inspection of New Fuel ' , 
'4.2.II .D.2 On-line Fuel System Monitoring', 
'4.2. II.D .3 Post -irradiation Surveillance', 
'4.2. III Review Procedures', 
' 4.2.IV Evaluation Findings ', 
'4. 2 . V Implementation ' , 
' 4.2.VI References', 
'4.2.VII Appendix', 
4.3 Nuclear Design', 
'4.3 .I Areas of Re view ' , 
'4.3.II Acceptance Criteria', 
'4.3 .III Re view Procedures ', 
'4. 3.IV Evaluation Finding', 
'4 .3.V Implementation', 
'4.3. VI References', 
'4.3. VII Appendix', 
4. 4 Thermal and Hydraulic Design' , 
'4.4.I Areas of Review ' , 
'4.4. II Acceptance Criteria', 
'4.4.III Re view Procedures', 
'4.4 .IV Evaluation Findings', 
'4.4 .V I mplementat ion ', 
'4 .4.VI References']). 
do (?choice) . 
end . 
topic 'index'. 
ask (' 
IND EX 
(please click on your choice)' , choice, 
[ 
'acceptance cri teria ' , 
'analysis', 
'analytical predictions', 
ballooning' , 
' blockage ', 
' bowing ' , 
'bursting ' , 
cladding ', 
embrittlement ', 
melting ' , 
mois ture level ' , 
overheating ' , 
pellet/cladding interaction ', 
' coolabili ty ', 
damage', 
'deformation', 
'densification', 
' design basis ', 
earthquake ' , 
fracturing ' , 
' fretting ', 
' fuel', 
pellet overheating ', 
r od ballooning ' , 
rod bowing', 
rod failure ' , 
s ys tem damage ', 
system design ' , 
temperature', 
violence expulsion ', 
grid ', 
hydraulic design ' , 
loss-of-coolant-accident', 
nuclear design ' , 
overheating of ' , 
stored energy ' ] ). 
do (?choice ) . 
end. 
t opic '4.2 Fuel System Design '. 
do (' I Fuel System Design '). 
end. 
t opic '4. 2 . I Areas of Review• . 
do (' I . A Areas of Re view '). 
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ask (' Please click on your choice', area, 
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[ 
'4.2 .I . A Design Bases ' , 
'4.2.I. B Description and Design Drawings', 
'4. 2.I.C Design Evaluation', 
'4. 2.I.D Testing, Inspection, and Surveillance Plans ' , 
'Content' , 
'Index ' , 
' Opening Menu ']). 
do (?area). 
end . 
topic '4.2.I. A Design Bases' . 
do (' I . A. 1 Design Bases '). 
ask ('Please click on your choice', next, 
[ 
'4.2. I.B Description and Design Drawings', 
'4 .2 .I. C Design Evaluation ', 
'4.2 .I . D Testing, Inspection, and Surveillance Plans ', 
'Content ' , 
'Index', 
'Opening Menu ' ] ). 
do (?next). 
end. 
topic '4.2.I .B Description and Design Drawings'. 
do (' I.A .2 Description and Design Drawings'). 
ask ('Please click on your choice', next , 
[ 
'4.2 .I . A Design Bases', 
'4.2. I.C Design Evaluation', 
'4. 2.I . D Testing , Inspection, and Surveillance Plans', 
'Content ', 
'Index' , 
' Opening Menu ']). 
do (?next ). 
end. 
topic ' 4. 2.I.C Design Evaluation '. 
do ('I .A .3 Design Evaluation '). 
ask ('Please click on your choice' , next, 
[ 
'4.2. I . A Design Bases', 
'4.2.I. B Description and Design Drawings', 
'4.2. I . D Testing, I nspection, and Surveillance Plans', 
'Content ', 
' Index', 
' Opening Menu']) . 
do (?next). 
end. 
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topic '4.2.I.D Testing, Inspection , and Surveillance Plans'. 
do ('I.A.4 Testing, Inspection, and Surveillance Plans' ). 
ask ('Please click on your choice', next, 
[ 
'4 .2.I.A Design Bases ' , 
' 4.2.I.B Description and Design Drawings', 
' 4.2 . I.C Design Evaluation', 
' 4.2.II Acceptance Criteria', 
'Content', 
' Index', 
' Opening Menu ' ] ). 
do (?next). 
end. 
topic '4.2.II Acceptance Criteria ' . 
do ('I.B Acceptance Criteria' ). 
ask (' Please click on your choice', area, 
[ 
'4. 2.II.A Design Bases ' , 
'4.2 . II.B Description and Design Drawings', 
'4.2 .II.C Design Evaluation ', 
' 4.2.II.D Testing, Inspection, and Surveillance Plans', 
'Content', 
' Index', 
' Opening Menu']). 
do (?area). 
end. 
topic ' 4.2.II.A Design Bases '. 
do ( ' I.B.1 Design Bases') . 
ask ('Please click on your choice', next, 
[ 
'4.2. II.A.1 Fuel System Damage ', 
'4.2. II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure ', 
'4.2. II.A.3 Fuel Coolability', 
'Content', 
' Index ' , 
' Opening Menu ' ]) . 
do (?next). 
end . 
topic '4.2.II.A.1 Fuel System Damage '. 
do ('I. B. 1.a Fuel System Damage') . 
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ask ('Please click on your choice', next, 
[ 
'4.2. II . A.2 Fuel Rod Failure', 
'4.2. II.A.3 Fuel Coolability', 
'Content ' , 
'Index', 
' Opening Menu']) . 
do (?next). 
end. 
topic ' 4.2.II . A.2 Fuel Rod Failure '. 
do ('I.B. 1 .b Fuel Rod Failure '). 
ask ('Please click on your choice', ne xt, 
[ 
' 4 .2. II.A.1 Fuel System Damage ' , 
' 4.2 . II.A.3 Fuel Coolability', 
'Content ', 
'Index', 
'Opening Menu']) . 
do (?next). 
end . 
topic ' 4 . 2 . II.A .3 Fuel Coolability'. 
do (' I . B. 1 .c Fuel Coolability'). 
ask (' Please click on your choice ', next, 
[ 
'4.2.II. A.1 Fuel System Damage' , 
'4.2. II . A.2 Fuel Rod Failure ', 
'4.2. II.B Description and Design Drawings', 
'Content ', 
'Index', 
'Opening Menu•)). 
do (?next). 
end . 
topic ' 4.2.II.B Description and Design Drawings'. 
do ('I. B.2 Description and Design Drawings') . 
ask ('Please click on your choice', next, 
[ 
' 4.2 . II . A Design Bases ', 
' 4.2.II.C Design Evaluation' , 
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' 4.2.II . D Testing, Inspection, and Surveillance Plans ' , 
' Content ' , 
' Index' , 
' Opening Menu ']). 
do (?next). 
end . 
topic '4.2.II.C Design Evaluat ion'. 
do ('I. B.3 Design Evaluation '). 
ask ('Please click on your choice ' , next, 
[ 
'4 .2.II .C. 1 Operating Experience' , 
'4. 2.II .C.2 Protot ype Testing ', 
'4. 2 . II.C .3 Analytical Predictions ' , 
'Content ', 
'Index ' , 
' Opening Menu ' ] ). 
do (?next) . 
end. 
topic '4.2.II.C. 1 Operating Experienc e '. 
do ('I.B.3.a Operating Experience'). 
ask ('Please click on your choice', next, 
[ 
'4.2.II . C.2 Prototype Test ing ' , 
'4. 2 . II . C.3 Analytical Predictions ' , 
'Content ' , 
' Index ' , 
'Opening Menu']). 
do (?next) . 
end. 
topic ' 4 .2. II. C. 2 Prototype Testing '. 
do (' I.B.3 .b Prototype Testing '). 
ask ('Please click on your choi ce ', next, 
[ 
'4. 2.II.C.1 Operating Experience ' , 
'4. 2.II.C . 3 Analytical Predictions ' , 
'Content ', 
' Index ' , 
' Opening Menu ' ] ). 
do (?next ). 
end. 
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topic '4.2 . II.C .3 Analytical Predictions '. 
do (' I . B.3.c Analytical Predictions ') . 
ask (' Please click on your choi ce ' , next, 
[ 
' 4.2.II.C.1 Operating Experience', 
'4 . 2. II.C .2 Prototype Testing ' , 
'4 .2 . II . D Testing, Inspection, and Surveillance Plans ' , 
' Content ', 
' Index' , 
' Opening Menu']) . 
do (?next). 
end . 
topic '4. 2.II.D Testing, Inspection, and Surveillance Plans '. 
do ('I.B.4 Testing , In~pec tion, and Surve illance Plans'). 
ask (' Please click on your choice ', next, 
[ 
'4.2. II .D.1 Testing and Inspection of New Fuel ' , 
' 4.2.II.D.2 On-line Fuel System Monitoring ' , 
'4.2. II .D.3 Post-irradi ation Surveillance ' , 
'Cqntent ' , 
' Index', 
' Opening Menu'] ). 
do (?next). 
end. 
topic '4.2 . II . D. 1 Testing and Inspection of New Fuel '. 
do (' I.B.4.a Testing and Inspection of New Fuel' ) . 
ask (' Please click on your choice ' , next, 
[ 
'4. 2.II.D .2 On-line Fuel System Monitoring', 
'4.2 .II.D . 3 Post- irradiation Surveillance', 
'Content' , 
' Index', 
' Opening Menu']). 
do (?next). 
end. 
topic '4 . 2.II . D.2 On-line Fuel Sys tem Monitoring '. 
do (' I . B.4.b On-line Fuel System Monitoring '). 
ask ( ' Please click on your choice ' , next , 
[ 
' 4 . 2 .II .D. 1 Testing and Inspection of New Fuel ', 
'4 .2 . II .D.3 Post - irradiation Surveillance', 
'Content ' , 
' Index ' , 
' Opening Menu•]). 
do (?ne xt ) . 
end. 
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topic '4 .2 .II.D.3 Post- irradiation Surveillance'. 
do ('I.B.4.c Pos t -irradiation Surveillanc e '). 
ask (' Pl ease cli ck on your choi ce' , next, 
[ 
'4.2. II . D.1 Testing and Inspection of New Fuel ', 
' 4.2.II.D.2 On-line Fuel System Monitoring ' , 
' 4.2.III Review Procedures', 
'Content ', 
' Index ', 
' Opening Menu']). 
do (?next ). 
end. 
topic '4.2.III Review Procedures'. 
do ('I.C Review Procedures '). 
ask (' Please click on your choice', next, 
[ 
'4.2. IV Evaluation Findings', 
'Content ' , 
' Index', 
'Opening Menu']) . 
do (?next ). 
end . 
topic '4.2 .IV Evaluation Findings'. 
do (' I .D Evaluation Findings'). 
ask ('Please click on your choice', next, 
[ 
' 4.2.V I mplementation', 
'Content ' , 
'Index ', 
' Opening Menu']). 
do (?next). 
end . 
topic ' 4.2.V I mplementation '. 
do (' I . E Implementat ion'). 
ask (' Please click on your choice', next, 
[ 
'4.2. VI References' , 
' Content', 
' Index', 
'Open i ng Menu ']). 
do (?next). 
end . 
t opic ' 4.2.VI References '. 
do (' I.F References '). 
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ask ( ' Please click on your choice', next , 
[ 
' 4.2 . VII Appendix ', 
'Content ' , 
'Inde x' , 
' Opening Menu ' ] ). 
do (?next ). 
end . 
t opic ' 4.2.VII Appendix'. 
do ('I. G Appendix'). 
ask (' Please click on your ch oi ce', next, 
[ 
'4.2. I Areas of Review ', 
' 4.2.II Acceptanc e Criteria ' , 
' 4.2.III Review Procedures ' , 
'4. 2.IV Evaluation Findings ' , 
' 4.2 . V Implementat ion ' , 
' 4. 2. VI References' , 
' 4.3 Nuclear Design ', 
'Content', 
' Index ' , 
' Opening Menu ' ] ). 
do (?next). 
end . 
topic ' 4.3 Nuc lear Design'. 
do ('II Nuclear Design'). 
end . 
topic '4.3 .I Areas of Re view ' . 
do (' II . A Areas of Review'). 
ask ( ' Please cli ck on your choice ', next, 
[ 
'4.3. II Acceptance Criteria', 
' Content', 
' Index ', 
' Opening Menu']). 
do (?next). 
end. 
topic ' 4.3.II Acceptance Criteria' . 
do ('II.B Acc eptanc e Criteria'). 
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ask (' Please click on your choice', next, 
[ 
'4.3 . III Review Procedures ', 
'Content' , 
'Index', 
' Opening Menu']). 
do (?next). 
end. 
topic '4.3. I I I Review Procedures'. 
do (' II . C Review Procedures'). 
ask (' Please click on your choice', next, 
[ 
'4.3 .IV Evaluation Finding ', 
'Content ' , 
' Index', 
'Opening Menu']). 
do (?next ). 
end . 
topic '4.3.IV Evaluation Finding '. 
do ('II.D Evaluation Finding ') . 
ask (' Pleas e click on your choice', next, 
[ 
'4.3. V I mplementation ' , 
'Content ' , 
' Index ', 
'Opening Menu']). 
do (?next ). 
end. 
topic '4.3.V Implementation ' . 
do ('II . E Implementation'). 
ask ('Please click on your choice' , next, 
[ 
'4.3. VI References' , 
'Content ', 
' Index ' , 
'Opening Menu ' ] ). 
do (?next). 
end. 
topic '4.3. VI References'. 
do ('II . F References'). 
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ask ('Please click on your choice', next, 
[ 
'4.3.VII Appendix ' , 
'Content', 
' Index ', 
' Opening Menu']). 
do (?next) . 
end . 
topic '4.3. VII Appendix '. 
do (' II.G Appendix '). 
ask ('Please click on your choice', next, 
[ 
'4 .3 . I Areas of Review', 
' 4.3.II Acceptance Criteria', 
' 4 .3. III Review Procedures ' , 
' 4.3 . IV Evaluation Finding ' , 
' 4.3. V Implementation', 
'4.3. VI References', 
' 4.4 Thermal and Hydraulic Design', 
'Content', 
'Index', 
'Opening Menu']) . 
do (?next). 
end. 
topic '4. 4 Thermal and Hydraulic Design' . 
do ('III Thermal and Hydraulic Design'). 
end. 
topic '4. 4 .I Areas of Review '. 
do ('III. A Areas of Review• ). 
ask (' Please click on your choice', next, 
[ 
' 4 . 4 . II Acceptance Criteria', 
'Content ' , 
' Index ' , 
' Opening Menu ' ] ). 
do (?next ). 
end. 
topic ' 4.4 . II Acceptance Criteria'. 
do (' III.B Acceptance Criteria ') . 
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ask ('Please click on your choice', next, 
[ 
' 4 . 4 .III Review Procedures' , 
'Content', 
' Index' , 
' Opening Menu']). 
do (?next ). 
end. 
t opic ' 4.4.III Review Procedures'. 
do ('III . C Review Procedures '). 
ask ('Please click on your choi ce', next, 
[ 
' 4 . 4 . IV Evaluation Findings ' , 
' Cop.tent ', 
' Index ', 
'Opening Menu ' ] ). 
do (?next) . 
end . 
t opic '4.4 .IV Evaluation Findings '. 
do ('III.D Evaluation Findings '). 
ask ('Please click on your choice ' , next , 
[ 
'4.4.V Implementation', 
'Content ' , 
'Index ' , 
' Opening Menu']) . 
do (?next ). 
end. 
topic '4.4.V Implementation '. 
do ( ' III.E Implementation') . 
ask ('Please click on your choice' , next , 
[ 
'4. 4 . VI References ' , 
'Content ', 
' Index ' , 
' Opening Menu ' ] ). 
do (?next). 
end. 
topic '4.4.VI References'. 
do ('III.F References') . 
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ask ('Please click on your choice', next, 
[ 
'4.4 . I Areas of Review', 
'4. 4.II Acceptance Criteria', 
'4.4 . III Review Procedures ' , 
' 4.4 . IV Evaluation Findings', 
'4. 4.V Implementation ' , 
'Content', 
'Index', 
'Opening Menu']). 
do (?next) . 
end. 
topic 'acceptance criteria'. 
ask (' 
You can find topic '' Acceptance Criteria'' in: 
(please click on your choice) ' , click, 
[ 
'Acceptance Criteria in Fuel System Design ' , 
' Acceptance Criteria in Nuclear Design ', 
'Acceptance Criteria in Thermal and Hydraulic Design']). 
if ?click is 'Acceptance Criteria in Fuel System Design ' 
then do ('I .B Acceptance Criteria') and do (follow) 
else if ?click is 'Acceptance Criteria in Nuclear Design' 
then do ('II.B Acceptance Criteria') and do (follow) 
else if ?click is ' Acceptance Criteria in Thermal and Hydraulic Design' 
then do ('III.B Acceptance Criteria') and do (follow) . 
end. 
topic 'follow'. 
ask (' 
What would you like to do next?', see, 
[ 
'Other choices under the same topic', 
'Content', 
' Index ' , 
'Opening Menu']). 
if ?see is ' Other choices under the same topic' then do (?choice) 
else do (?see) . 
end. 
topic 'analysis'. 
say (' 
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You can find topic '' Analysis of Loads '' in : 
Appendix of Fuel System Design, part A 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ('4.2.VII Appendix ') . 
end. 
topic 'analytical predictions'. 
say (' 
You can find topic ' 'Analytical Predictions '' in: 
4.2 . II . C.3 Analytical Predictions 
(please press Space t o continue)') 
and do ('4.2.II.C.3 Analytical Predictions'). 
end. 
topic '_ballooning' . 
ask (' 
You can find topic '' Ballooning '' in: 
(please click on your choice)', click, 
[ 
' Fuel Coolability, part d ', 
' Analytical Predictions, part e ']). 
if ?click is ' Fuel Coolability, part d ' 
then do (' I .B.1. c Fuel Coolability') and do ( f ollow) 
else if ?click is 'Analytical Predictions, part e ' 
then do ('I .B .3.c Analytical Predic tions') and do ( follow ) . 
end . 
topic 'blockage ' . 
say (' 
See topic ''Ballooning '' 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ('ballooning'). 
end. 
topic 'bowing'. 
say (' 
You can find topic '' Bowing '' in : 
4.2.II.C . 3 Analytical Predict i ons, part c 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ( ' 4.2.II.C.3 Analytical Predictions '). 
end. 
topic 'bursting'. 
ask (' 
You can find topic ''Bursting' ' in: 
(please click on your choi ce )', click, 
[ 
' Fuel Rod Failure, part h ' , 
' Fuel Coolability , part d ' ]) . 
if ?click is 'Fuel Rod Failure , part h ' 
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then do (' I .B. 1 .b Fuel Rod Failure') and do (follow) 
else i f ?click is ' Fuel Coolability, part d ' 
then do ('l. B. 1. c Fuel Coolability') and do (follow). 
end . 
topic 'cladding '. 
ask (' 
You can find t opic connected to '' Cladding '' i n: 
(please c lick on your choi ce)', c l ick, 
[ 
embri t t lement' , 
melting', 
moisture level ' , 
overheating ' , 
pellet /cladding interaction ' ]) . 
do ( ?click). 
end . 
topic ' 
say (' 
embrittlement '. 
You can find topic '' Cladding Embrittlement '' i n : 
4.2.II . A. 3 Fuel Coolability, part a 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ('4. 2 . II . A. 3 Fuel Coolability' ) . 
end. 
topic ' 
say (' 
melting'. 
You can find topic ' 'Cladding Melting' ' in : 
4.2.II.A.3 Fuel Coolability, part c 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ('4 .2.II . A. 3 Fuel Coolab i lity'). 
end . 
topic ' 
say ( ' 
moisture level ' . 
You can find topic ''Cladding Moisture Level'' in: 
4.2.II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure, part a 
(please press Space to continue )') 
and do ('4.2.II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure '). 
end. 
topic ' 
say (' 
overheating'. 
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You can find topic ''Overheating of Cladding'' in: 
4 . 2.II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure, part d 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ('4.2.II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure') . 
end. 
topic ' 
say (' 
pellet / cladding interaction ' . 
You can find topic ''Pellet/ Cladding Interaction '' in: 
4 .2.II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure, part g 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ('4.2.II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure '). 
end. 
topic 'coolability'. 
say (' 
You can find topic ''Fuel Coolability'' in : 
4.2.II.A.3 Fuel Coolability 
(please press Space to continue)' ) 
and do ('4.2.II.A.3 Fuel Coolability'). 
end. 
topic 'damage'. 
say (' 
You can find topic '' Fuel System Damage '' in : 
4.2.II.A.1 Fuel System Damage 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ('4.2.II.A.1 Fuel Sys tem Damage' ) . 
end . 
topic 'deformation'. 
say (' 
You can find topic ''Structural Deformation' ' in: 
4.2.II.A.3 Fuel Coolability, part e 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ('4.2.II.A.3 Fuel Coolability'). 
end . 
topic 'densification'. 
say (' 
You can find topic ''Densification Effec t' ' in : 
4.2.II.C.3 Analytical Predictions, part b 
(please press Space to continue)') 
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and do ('4.2.I I.C.3 Analytical Predictions'). 
end. 
topic 'design basis' . 
say (' 
You can find topic '' Design Basis '' in : 
4.2.II.A Design Bases 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ('4.2.II.A Design Bases') . 
end. 
topic ' earthquake '. 
say (' 
You c an find topic ''Safe Shutdown Earthquake '' in 
4.2.VII Appendix, part D.2 
(please press Space t o continue)') 
and do ('4.2.VII Appendix' ). 
end. 
topic 'fracturing'. 
say (' 
Yo~ can find topic '' Mechanical Fracturing'' in 
4.2.II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure, part i 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ('4.2.II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure '). 
end. 
topic ' fretting'. 
say (' 
You can find topic '' Fretting '' in 
4.2.II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure, part c 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ('4.2.II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure '). 
end. 
t opic 'fuel' . 
ask (' 
You can find topic connected to '' Fuel ' ' in: 
(please click on your choice)', click, 
[ 
pellet overheating' , 
rod ballooning' , 
rod bowing', 
rod failure ', 
system damage ' , 
system design ', 
temperature ' , 
violenc e expulsion']). 
do (?click). 
end. 
topic ' 
say (' 
pellet overheating '. 
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You can find topic ''Overheating of Fuel Pellets '' in: 
4.2.II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure, part e 
(please press Space to continue) ' ) 
and do ('4 .2 . II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure ') . 
end. 
topic ' rod ballooning'. 
say (' 
See topic '' Ballooning '' 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do (' ballooning' ) . 
end. 
topic ' 
say (' 
rod bowing ' . 
See topic ''Bowing'' 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do (' bowing'). 
end . 
topic ' 
say (' 
rod failure'. 
You can find topic '' Fuel Failure '' in: 
4.2.II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ('4 .2.II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure '). 
end. 
topic ' 
say (' 
s ystem damage'. 
You can find topic '' Fuel System Damage '' in: 
4.2.II.A.1 Fuel System Damage 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ('4.2. II.A . 1 Fuel System Damage'). 
end . 
topic ' 
say (' 
system design' . 
You can find topic '' Fuel System Design '' in: 
4.2 Fuel System Design 
(please press Space to continue) ' ) 
and do ('4.2 Fuel System Design '). 
end . 
topic ' 
say (' 
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temperature'. 
You can find topic ''Fuel Temperatures '' in: 
4.2.II.C.3 Analytical Predictions, part a 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ('4.2.II.C.3 Analytical Predictions'). 
end. 
topic ' 
say (' 
violence expulsion' . 
You can find topic '' Violent Expulsion of Fuel' ' in: 
4.2 . II.A.3 Fuel Coolability, part b 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ('4.2 . II.A.3 Fuel Coolability'). 
end. 
topic 'grid'. 
say (' 
You can find topic ''Grids'' in 
4.2.VII Appendix A, part C 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ('4.2.VII Appendix'). 
end. 
topic ' hydraulic design '. 
say (' 
You can find topic ''Hydraulic Design'' in: 
4.4 Thermal and Hydraulic Design 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ('4.4 Thermal and Hydraulic Design' ). 
end. 
topic 'loss-of -coolant-accident '. 
say (' 
You can find topic ''Loss-of-coolant-accident'' in: 
4.2.VII Appendix A, part D 
(please press Space to continue)') 
and do ('4.2.VII Appendix') . 
end. 
topic 'nuclear design ' . 
say (' 
You can find topic ''Nuclear Design'' in: 
4.3 Nuclear Design 
(please press Space to continue )') 
and do ('4.3 Nuclear Design'). 
end. 
topic 'overheating of'. 
say (' 
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You can find topic ''Overheating of '' in: 
1 . Fuel Rod Failure, part d, i.e ., Overheating of Cladding, and 
2. Fuel Rod Failure, part e, i.e., Overheating of Fuel Pellets 
(please press Space t o continue)') 
and do ('4.2.II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure '). 
end. 
topic 'stored energy'. 
say (' 
See topic '' Fuel Temperatures'' 
(please press Space t o continue )') 
and do ('temperature' ). 
end . 
topic ' I Fuel System Design'. 
ask (' 
4 . 2 FUEL SYSTEM DESIGN 
REVIEW RESPONSIBILITY 
Primary - Core Performance Branch (CPB ) 
Secondary - None 
This part contains 
(click on your choice)' ,part, 
[ 
'4.2.I Areas of Review' , 
'4.2.I I Acceptance Criteria ' , 
'4.2. III Review Procedures ', 
'4.2 . IV Evaluation Findings ', 
'4 . 2.V Implementation ', 
'4.2. VI References' , 
'4.2 .VII Appendix ', 
'Content', 
' Index', 
' Opening Menu']). 
do (?part). 
end. 
topic ' I.A Areas of Review'. 
say (' 
4.2.I Areas of Review 
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The thermal, mechanical, and materials design of the fuel system is evaluated 
by CPB. The fuel system consists of arrays (assemblies or bundles) of fuel 
rods including fuel pellets, insulator pellets, springs, tubular cladding, end 
closures, hydrogen getters, and fill gas; burnable poison rods including com-
ponents similar to those in fuel rods; spacer grids and springs; end plates; 
channel boxes; and reacti vity control rods . In the case of the control rods, 
this section covers the reactivit y control elements that extend from the 
coupling interface of the control rod drive mechanism into the core . The 
Mechanical Engineering Branch reviews the design of control rod drive 
mechanism in Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 3.9 .4 and the design of 
reactor internals in SRP Section 3.9.5. 
The objectives of the fuel system safety review are to provide assurance that 
(a) the fuel system is not damaged as a result of normal operation and anti-
cipated operational occurrences, (b) fuel system damage is never so severe as 
to prevent control rod insertion when it is required, (c) the number of fuel 
rod failures is not underestimated for postulated accidents, and (d ) coolabi-
lity is always maintained. "Not damaged," as used in the above statement, 
means that fuel rods do not fail, that fuel system dimensions remain within 
operational tolerances, and that functional capabilities are not reduced below 
those assumed in the safety analysis. This objective implements General Design 
#mCriterion 10#m (Ref . 1), and the design limts that accomplish this are called 
Specified Acceptable Fuel Design Limits (SAFDLs). "Fuel rod failure " means 
that the fuel rod leaks and that the first fission product barrier ( the 
cladding) has , therefore, been breached. fuel rod failures must be accounted 
for in the dose analysis required by #m10 CFR Part 100#m (Ref. 2) for postu-
lated accidents. "Coolability," in general, means that the fuel assembly reta-
ins its rod-bundle geometry with adequate coolant channels t o permit removal 
of residual heat even after a severe accident . The general requirements to 
maintain control rod insertability and core coolability appear repeatedly i n 
the General Design Criteria (e.g., #mGDC 27 and 35#m) . Specific coolability 
requirements for the loss-of-coolant accident are given in 10 CFR Part SO, 
#m&S0.46#m (Ref . 3). 
All fuel damage criteria are described in SRP Section 4.2. For those criteria 
that involve DNBR or CPR limits, specific thermal-hydraulic criteria are given 
in #mSRP Section 4.4#m. The available radioactive fission product inventory in 
fuel rods (i.e., the gap inventory expressed as a release fraction) is provi -
ded to the Accident Evaluation Branch for use in estimating the radiological 
consequences of plant releases. 
The fuel system review covers the following specific areas. 
(please press Space to continue) '). 
topic '10 CFR Part 100'. 
text is read ('p100 .ws'). 
write (con: ,?text) . 
do (' I.A Areas of Review'). 
end. 
topic 'k50 .46 '. 
text is read (' p50_46.w s '). 
write (con:,?text ). 
do (' I.A Areas of Review') . 
end . 
end. 
topic ' I.A . 1 Design Bases ' . 
say ( ' 
4.2.I.A Design Bases 
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Design bases for the safety analysis address fuel system damage mechanisms and 
provide limiting values for important parameters such that damage will be 
limited to acceptable levels . The design bases should reflect the safet y 
review objective s as described above. 
(please press Space t o continue )'). 
enq. 
topic ' I.A .2 Descri ption and Design Drawings ' . 
say (' 
4.2.I.B Description and Design Drawings 
The fuel s ystem description and design drawing are reviewed. In general, the 
description will emphasize produc t specifications rather than process speci-
fications . 
(please press Space to continue)'). 
end. 
topic ' I.A .3 Design Evaluation '. 
say (' 
4.2.I.C Design Evaluation 
The performance of the fuel s ystem during normal operation, anticipated opera-
tional occurrences, and postulated accidents is reviewed to determine if all 
design bases are met. The fuel system components, as listed above, are revi-
ewed not only as separate components but also as integral units such as fuel 
rods and fuel assemblies. The review consists of an evaluation of operating 
experience, direct experimental comparisons, detailed mathematical analyses, 
and other information . 
(please press Space to continue)'). 
end . 
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topic 'I.A.4 Testing, Inspection, and Surveillance Plans '. 
say (' 
4.2.I.D Testing, Inspection, and Surveillance Plans 
Testing and inspection of new fuel is performed by the licensee to ensure that 
the fuel is fabricated in accordance with the design and that it reaches the 
plant site and is loaded in the core without damage. On-line fuel rod failure 
monitoring and postirradiation surveillance should be performed to detect ano-
malies or confirm that the fuel system is performing as expected; surveillance 
of control rods containing B4C should be performed to ensure against reacti-
vity loss. The testing, inspection, and surveillance plans along with their 
reporting provisions are reviewed by CPB to ensure that the important fuel 
design considerations have been addressed. 
(please press Space t o continue)'). 
end. 
topic 'I.B Acceptance Criteria '. 
say ( ' 
4 . 2.II Acceptance Criteria 
Specific criteria necessary to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, 
#m&S0.46#m; #mGeneral Design Criteria 10, 27, and 35#m; #mAppendix K#m to 10 
CFR Part 50; and #m10 CFR Part 100#m identified in subsection I of this SRP 
section as follows: 
(please press Space to continue)'). 
topic '&50.46'. 
text is read ('p50_46.ws'). 
write (con:,?text). 
do ('I.B Acceptance Criteria' ) . 
end. 
topic 'Appendix K'. 
text is read ('app_k.ws'). 
write (con: ,?text ). 
do ('I.B Acceptance Criteria '). 
end. 
topic ' 10 CFR Part 100 '. 
text is read ( 'p100.ws '). 
write (con: ,?text). 
do ('I.B Acceptance Criteria '). 
end. 
end. 
topic 'l.B.1 Design Bases' . 
say (' 
4.2.II.A Design Bases 
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The fuel system design bases must reflect the four objectives described in 
subsection I, Areas of Review. To satisfy these objectives, acceptance crite-
ria are needed for fuel s ystem damage, fuel rod failure, and fuel coolability. 
These criteria are discussed in the following: 
(please press Space to continue)'). 
end. 
topic 'l.B.1.a Fuel System Damage '. 
say (' 
4 . 2.II.A.1 Fuel System Damage 
This subsection applies to normal operation, and the information to be revi-
ewed should be contained in Section 4.2 of the Safety Analysis Report. 
To meet the requirements of General Design #mCriterion 10#m as it relates to 
Specified Acceptable Fuel Design Limits for normal operation, including anti-
cipated operational occurrences, fuel system damage criteria should be given 
for all known damage mechanisms. 
Fuel system damage includes fuel rod failure, which is discussed below in sub-
section II.A.2. In addition to precluding fuel rod failure, fuel damage crite-
ria should assure that fuel system dimensions remain within operational tole-
rances and that functional capabilities are not reduced below those assumed in 
the safety analysis. Such damage criteria should address the following to be 
complete. 
(a) Stress, strain, or loading limits for spacer grids, guide tubes, thimbles, 
fuel rods, control rods, channel boxes, and other fuel s ys tem structural 
members should be provided. Stress limits that are obtained by methods 
similar to those given in Section III of the ASME Code (Ref. 4) are accep-
table. Other proposed limits must be justified . 
(b) The cumulative number of strain fatigue cycles on the structural members 
mentioned in paragraph (a) above should be significantly less than the 
design fatigue lifetime, which is based on appropriate data and includes a 
safety factor of 2 on stress amplitude or a safety factor of 20 on the 
number of cycles (Ref. 5). Other proposed limits must be justified. 
(c) Fretting wear at contact points on the structural members mentioned in 
paragraph (a) above should be limited. The allowable fretting wear should 
be stated in the Safety Analys is Report and the stress and fatigue limits 
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in paragraph (a) and (b) above should presume the existence of this wear. 
(d) Oxidation, hydriding, and the buildup of corrosion products (crud ) should 
be limited. Allowable oxidation, hydriding, and crud levels should be dis-
cussed in the Safety Analysis Report and shown t o be acceptable. These 
levels should be presumed to exist in paragraph (a) and (b) above . The 
effect of crud on thermal-hydraulic considerations is reviewed as descri-
bed in SRP Section 4.4. 
( e) Dimensional changes such as rod bowing or irradiation growth of fuel rods, 
control rods, and guide tubes need be limited to set values (i.e., damage 
limits), but they must be included in the design analysis to establish 
operational tolerances. 
(f) Fuel and burnable poison rod internal gas pressures should remain below 
the nominal system pressure during normal operat i on unless otherwise jus-
tified. 
(g) Worst-case hydraulic loads for normal operation should not exceed the 
holddown capability of the fuel assembly (e ither gravity or holddown 
springs). Hydraulic loads f or this evaluation are reviewed as described 
in SRP Section 4.4. 
(h) Control rod reactivity must be maintained. This may require the control 
rods to remain watertight if water- soluble or leachable materials ( e . g. , 
B4C ) are used. 
(please press Space to cont inue)'). 
end. 
topic 'l.B.1.b Fuel Rod Failure'. 
say (' 
4.2.II.A.2 Fuel Rod Failure 
This subsection applies to normal operation, anticipated operational occur-
rences, and postulated accidents. Paragraph (a) through (c) address failure 
mechanisms that are more limiting during normal operation, and the information 
to be reviewed should be contained in Section 4.2 of the Safety Analysis 
Report. Paragraph (d) through (h) address failure mechanisms that are more 
limiting during anticipated operational occurrences and postulated accidents, 
and the information t o be reviewed will usually be contained in Chapter 15 of 
the Safety Analysis Report. Paragraph (i) should be addressed in Section 4.2 
of the Safety Analysis Report because it is not addressed elsewhere. 
To meet the requirements of (a) General Design #mCriterion 10#m as it relates 
to Specified Acceptable Fuel Design Limits for normal Operation, including an-
ticipated operational occurrences, and (b) #m10 CFR Part 100#rn as it relates 
to fission product releases for postulated accidents,fuel rod failure criteria 
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should be given for all known fuel rod failure mechanisms. Fuel rod failure is 
defined as the loss of fuel rod hermeticity . Although we recognize that it is 
not possible to avoid all fuel rod failures and that cleanup systems are ins-
talled to handle a small number of leaking rods, it is the objective of the 
review to assure that fuel does not fail due to specific causes during normal 
operation and anticipated operational occurrences. Fuel rod failures are per-
mitted during postulated accidents, but they must be accounted for in the dose 
analysis. 
Fuel rod failures can be caused by overheating, pellet/ cladding interaction 
(PCI), hydriding, cladding collapse, bursting, mechanical fracturing, and 
fretting. Fuel failure criteria should address the following to be complete . 
( a) Hydriding: Hydriding as a cause of failure (i . e., primary hydriding ) is 
prevented by keeping the level of moisture and other hydrogenous impuri-
ties very low during fabrication. Acceptable moisture levels for Zircaloy-
clad uranium oxide fuel should be no greater than 20 ppm. Current ASTM 
specifications (Ref. 7) for U02 fuel pellets state an equivalent limit of 
2 ppm of hydrogen from all sources. For other materials clad in Zircaloy 
tubing, an equivalent quantity of moisture of hydrogen can be tolerated. 
A moisture of 2 mg H20 per cm3 of hot void volume within the Zircaloy 
cladding has been shown (Ref. 8) to be insufficient for primary hydride 
formation . 
(b) Cladding Collapse: If axial gaps in the fuel pellet column occur due to 
densification, the cladding has the potential of collapsing into a gap (i. 
e., flattening). Because of the large local strains that accompany this 
process, collapse (flattened) cladding is assumed t o fail. 
(c) Fretting: Fretting is a potential cause of fuel failure , but it is a gra-
dual process that would not be effective during the brief duration of an 
abnormal operational occurrence of a postulated accident. Therefore, the 
fretting wear requirement in paragraph (c) of subsection II.A.1, Fuel 
Damage , is sufficient to preclude fuel failures caused by fretting during 
transients . 
(d) Overheating of Cladding : It has been traditional practice to assume that 
failures will not occur if the thermal margin criteria (DNBR for PWRs and 
CPR for BWRs) are satisfied. The review of these criteria is detailed in 
SRP Section 4.4. For postulated accidents, the total number of fuel rods 
that exceed the criteria has been assumed to fail for radiological dose 
calculation purposes. 
Although a thermal margin criterion is sufficient to demonstrate the avoi-
dance of overheating from a deficient cooling mechanism, it is not a 
necessary condition (i.e., DNB is not a failure mechanism) and other 
mechanistic methods may be acc eptable. There is at present little experi -
ence with other approaches, but new positions recommending different cri-
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teria should address cladding temperature, pressure, time duration, oxida-
tion, and embrittlement. 
(e) Overheating of Fuel Pellets: It has also been traditional practice to 
assume that failure will occur if centerline melting takes place. This 
analysis should be performed for the maximum linear heat generation rate 
anywhere in the core, including all hot spots and hot channel factors, and 
should account for the effects of burnup and composition on the melting 
point. For normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences, cen-
terline melting is not permitted . For postulated accidents, the total num-
ber of rods that experience centerline melting should be assumed to fail 
for radiological dose calculation purposes. The centerline melting crite-
rion was established to assure that axial or radial relocation of molten 
fuel would neither allow molten fuel to come into contact with the clad-
ding nor produce local hot spots. The assumption that centerline melting 
results in fuel failure is conservative. 
(f) Excessive Fuel Enthalpy: For a severe reactivity initiated accident (RIA) 
in a BWR at zero or low power, fuel failure is assumed to occur if the 
radially averaged ruel rod enthalpy is greater than 170n cal/g at any 
axial location. For full-power RIAs in a BWR and all RIAs an a PWR, the 
thermal margin criteria ( DNBR and CPR) are used as fuel failure criteria 
to meet the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.77 (Ref . 6) as it relates to 
fuel rod failure. The 170 cal/g enthalpy criterion is primarily intended 
to address cladding overheating effects, but it also indirectly addresses 
pellet /cladding interactions (PCI). Other criteria may be more appropriate 
for an RIA, but continued approval of this enthalpy criterion and the 
thermal margin criteria may be given until generic studies yield improve-
ments. 
(g) Pellet / Cladding Interaction: There is no current criterion for fuel fai -
lure resulting from PCI, and the design basis can only be stated general-
l y. Two related criteria should be applied, but they are not sufficient 
to preclude PCI failures. (1) The uniform strain of the cladding should 
not exceed 1%. In this context, uniform strain (elastic and inelastic ) is 
defined as transient-induced deformation with gage lengths corresponding 
to cladding dimensions ; s teady-state creepdown and irradiation growth are 
excluded . Although observing thi s strain limit may preclude some PCI fai-
lures, it will not preclude the corrosion-assisted failures that occur at 
low strains, nor will it preclude highly localized overstrain failures. 
(2) Fuel melting should be avoided. The large volume increase associated 
with melting may cause a pellet with a molten center to exert a stress on 
the cladding. Such a PCI is avoided by avoiding fuel melting. Note that 
this same criterion was invoked in paragraph (e) to ensure tht overheating 
of the cladding would not occur. 
(h) Bursting : to meet the requirements of #mAppendix K#m of 10 CFR Part 50 
(Ref. 9) as it relates t o the incidence of rupture during a LOCA, a rup-
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ture temperature correlation must be used in the LOCA ECCS analysis. Zir-
caloy cladding will burst (rupture) under certain combinations of tempera-
ture, heating rate, and differential pressure . Although fuel suppliers may 
use different rupture-temperature vs differential-pressure curves, an ac-
ceptable curve should be similar to the one des cribed in Ref . 10. 
( i) Mechanical Fracturing: A mechanical fracture refers to a defect in a fuel 
rod caused by an externally applied force such as a hydraulic load or a 
load derived from core-plate motion. Cladding integrity may be assumed if 
the applied stress is less than 90% of the irradiated yield stress at the 
appropriate temperature . Other proposed limits must be justified. Results 
from the seismic and LOCA analysis ( see Appendix A to this SRP section) 
ma y show that failures by this mechanism will not occur for less severe 
events. 
(please press Space to continue)'). 
topic '10 CFR Part 100'. 
text is read (' p100.ws' ). 
write (con: , ?text). 
do (' I.B . 1.b Fuel Rod Failure ') . 
end . 
t opic ' Appendix K'. 
text is read (' app_k . ws '). 
write (con: ,?text) . 
do ( ' I.B.1.b Fuel Rod Failure ') . 
end. 
end . 
topic ' I . B. 1 . c Fuel Coolability'. 
say (' 
4 . 2.II.A.3 Fuel Coolability 
This subsection applies to postulated accidents, and most of the information 
to be reviewed will be contained in Chapter 15 of the Safety Analysis Report . 
Paragraph (e) addressed the combined effects of t wo accidents, however , and 
that information should be contained in Section 4.2 of the Safety Analysis 
Report. To meet the requirements of #mGeneral Design Criteria 27 and 35#m as 
they relate to control r od insertability and core coolability for postulated 
accidents, fuel coolability criteria should be given for all severe damage me-
chanisms. Coolability, or coolable geometry, has traditionally implied that 
the fuel assembly retains its r od-bundle geometry with adequate coolant chan-
nels to permit removal of residual heat . Reduct i on of coolability can result 
from cladding embrittlement, violent expulsion of fuel, generalized cladding 
melting, gross structural def ormation, and extreme coplanar fuel rod balloon-
ing . Control rod insertability criteria are also addressed in this subsection. 
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Such criteria should address the following to be complete: 
(a) Cladding Embrittlement: To meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, 
#m&50.46#m, as it relates to cladding embrittlement for a LOCA, acceptance 
criteria of 2200F on peak cladding temperature and 17% on maximum cladding 
oxidation must be met. (Note: If the cladding were predic ted to collapse 
in a given cycle, it would also be predicted to fail and, therefore, 
should not be irradiated in that cycle; consequently, the lower peak clad-
ding temperature limit of 1800F previously described in Ref . 11 is no 
longer needed. ) Similar temperature and oxidation criteria may be justi-
fied for other accidents. 
(b) Violent Expulsion of Fuel: In severe reactivity initiated accidents, such 
as rod ejection in a PWR or rod drop in a BWR, the large and rapid deposi-
tion of energy in the fuel can result in melting, fragmentation, and dis-
persal of fuel. The mechanical action associated with fuel dispersal can 
be sufficient to destroy the cladding and the rod-bundle geometry of the 
fuel and to produce pressure pulses in the primar y system. To meet the 
guidelines _of Regulatory Guide 1.77 as it relates to preventing wide-
spread fragmentation and dispersal of the fuel and avoiding the generation 
of pressure pulses in the primary system of a PWR, a radially averaged en-
thalpy limit of 280 cal/g should be observed . This 280 cal/ g limit should 
also be used for BWRs. 
(c) Generalized Cladding Melting: Generalized (i.e., non- local) melting of the 
cladding could result in the loss of rod-bundle fuel geometry . Criteria 
for cladding embrittlement in paragraph (a) above are more stringent than 
melting criteria would be; therefore, additional specific criteria are not 
used. 
(d) Fuel Rod Ballooning: To meet the requirements of #mAppendix K#m of 10 CFR 
Part 50 as it relates to degree of swelling, burst strain and flow block-
age resulting from cladding ballooning (swelling) must be taken into 
account in the analys i s of core flow di stribution. Burst strain and flo w 
blockage models must be based on applicable data (such as Refs . 10, 12, 
and 13 ) in such a way that (1) the temperature and differential pressure 
at which the c ladding will rupture are properly estimated (see paragraph 
(h) of subsection II.A.2), (2) the resultant degree of c ladding swelling 
is not underestimated, and (3) the associated reduction in assembly flow 
area is not underestimated. The flow blockage model evaluation is provided 
to the Reactor Systems Branch for incorporation in the comprehensive ECCS 
evaluation model to show t hat the 2200F cladding temperature and 17% clad-
ding oxidation limits are not exceeded. The reviwer should also determine 
if fuel rod ballooning should be included in the analysis of other acci-
dents involving system depressurization . 
(e) Structural Deformation: Analytical procedures are discussed in Appendix A, 
"Evaluation of Fuel Assembly Structural Response to Externally Applied 
Forces" . 
(please press Space to continue)') . 
topic ' &50.46'. 
text is read ('p50_46.ws'). 
write (con: ,?text). 
do ('I.B.1.c Fuel Coolability'). 
end. 
topic 'Appendix K'. 
text is read ('app_k.ws ' ). 
write (con: ,?text). 
do ('I.B.1.c Fuel Coolability'). 
end. 
end . 
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topic 'I.B.2 Description and Design Drawings'. 
say (' 
4.2.II.B Description and Design Drawings 
The reviewer should see that the fuel system description and design drawings 
are complete enough to provide an accurate representation and to supply infor-
mation needed in audit evaluations. Completeness is a matter of judgment, but 
the following fuel system information and associated tolerances are necessary 
for an acceptable fuel system description: 
Type and metallurgical state of the cladding 
Cladding outside diameter 
Cladding inside diameter 
Cladding inside roughness 
Pellet outside diameter 
Pellet roughness 
Pellet density 
Pellet resintering data 
Pellet length 
Pellet dish dimensions 
Burnable poison content 
Insulator pellet parameters 
Fuel column length 
Overall rod length 
Rod internal void volume 
Fill gas type and pressure 
Sorbed gas composition and content 
Spring and plug dimensions 
Fissile enrichment 
Equivalent hydraulic diameter 
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Coolant pressure 
The following design drawing have also been found necessary for an acceptable 
fuel system description: 
Fuel assembly cross section 
Fuel assembly outline 
Fuel rod schematic 
Spacer grid cross section 
Guide tuve and nozzle joint 
Control rod assembly cross section 
Control rod assembly outline 
Control rod schematic 
Burnable poison rod assembly cross section 
Burnable poison rod assembly outline 
Burnable poison rod schematic 
Orifice and source assembly outline 
(please press Space to continue) ' ). 
end. 
topic 'l.B .3 Design Evaluation' . 
say (' 
4.2.II.C Design Evaluation 
The methods of demonstrating that the design bases are met must be reviewed. 
Those methods include operating experience, prototype testing, and analytical 
predictions. Many of these methods will be presented generically in topical 
reports and will be incorporated in the Safety Analysis Report by reference. 
(please press Space to continue) ' ). 
end. 
topic 'I. B.3.a Operating Experience'. 
say (' 
4.2.II.C.1 Operating Experience 
Operating experience with fuel systems of the same or similar design should 
be described. When adherence to specific design criteria can be conclusively 
demonstrated with operating experience, prototype testing and design analyses 
that were performed prior to gaining that experience need not be reviewed. 
Design criteria for fretting wear, oxidation, hydriding, and crud buildup 
might be addressed in this manner. 
(please press Space to continue)'). 
end . 
topic 'I.B.3.b Prototype Testing '. 
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say (' 
4.2.II.C.2 Prototype Testing 
When conclusive operating experience is not available, as with the introduc-
tion of a design change, prototype testing should be reviewed. Out-of-reactor 
tests should be performed when practical to determine the characteristics of 
the new design. No definitive requirements have been developed regarding those 
design features that must be tested prior to irradiation, but the following 
out-of-reactor tests have been performed for this purpose and will serve as a 
guide to the reviewer: 
Spacer grid structural tests 
Control rod structural and performance tests 
Fuel assembly structural tests (lateral, axial and torsional stiffness, 
frequency, _and damping) 
Fuel assembly hydraulic flow tests (lift forces, control rod wear, 
vibration, and assembly wear and life) 
In-reactor testing of design features and lead-assembly irradiation of whole 
assemblies of a new design should be reviewed. The following phenomena that 
have been tested in this manner in new designs will serve as a guide to the 
re~iewer: 
Fuel and burnable poison rod growth 
Fuel rod bowing 
Fuel assembly growth 
Fuel assembly bowing 
Channel box wear and distortion 
Fuel rod ridging (PC!) 
Crud formation 
Fuel rod integrity 
Holddown spring relaxation 
Spacer grid spring relaxation 
Guide tube wear characteristics 
In some cases, in-reactor testing of a new fuel assembly design or a new 
design feature cannot be accomplished prior to operation of a full core of 
that design . This inability to perform in- reactor testing may result from an 
incompatability of the new design with the previous design. In such cases, 
special attention should be given to the surveillance plans (see subsection 
II.D) 
(please press Space to continue)'). 
end. 
topic 'l.B.3.c Analytical Predictions' . 
say (' 
4.2.II.C.3 Analytical Predictions 
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Some design bases and related parameters can only be evaluated with calcula-
tional procedures. The analytical methods that are used to make performance 
predictions must be reviewed. Many such reviews have been performed establis-
hing numerous examples for the reviewer. The following paragraph discuss the 
more established review patterns and provide many related references. 
(a) Fuel Temperatures (Stored Energy): Fuel temperatures and stored energy 
during normal operation are needed as input to ECCS performance calcula-
tions. The temperature calculations require complex computer codes that 
model many different phenomena . Phenomenological models that should be 
reviewed include the following: 
Radial power distribution 
Fuel and cladding temperature distribution 
Burnup distribution in the fuel 
Thermal conductivity of the fuel, cladding, cladding crud, 
and oxidation layers 
Densification of the fuel 
Thermal expansion of the fuel and cladding 
Fission gas production and release 
Solid and gaseous fission product swelling 
Fuel restructuring and relocation 
Fuel and cladding dimensional changes 
Fuel-to-cladding heat transfer coefficient 
Thermal conductivity of the gas mixture 
Thermal conductivity in the Knudsen domain 
Fuel- to-cladding contact pressure 
Heat capacity of the fuel and cladding 
Growth and creep of the cladding 
Rod internal gas pressure and composition 
Sorption of helium and other fill gases 
Cladding oxide and crud layer thickness 
Cladding- to-coolant heat transfer coefficient 
Because of the strong interaction between these models, overall code beha-
vior must be checked against data (standard problems or benchmarks) and 
the NRC audit codes (Refs. 14 and 15). Examples of previous fuel perfor-
mance code reviews are given in References 16 through 20. 
(b) Densification Effects: In addition to its effect on fuel temperatures 
(discussed above), densification affects (1) core power distributions (po-
wer spiking, see #mSRP Section 4.3#m), (2) the fuel linear heat generation 
rate (LHGR, see #mSRP Section 4.4#m), and (3) the potential for cladding 
collapse. Densification magnitudes for power spike and LHGR analyses are 
discussed in References 21 and in Regulatory Guide 1 . 126 (Ref. 22). To 
be acceptable, densification models should follow the guidelines of Regu-
latory Guide 1.126. Models for c ladding-collapse times must also be revi-
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ewed, and previous review examples are given in References 23 and 24. 
(c) Fuel Rod Bowing: Guidance f or the analysis of fuel rod bowing is given in 
References 25. Interim methods that may be used prior to compliance with 
this guidance are given in Reference 26. At this writing, the causes of 
fuel rod bowing are not well understood and mechanistic analyses of r od 
bowing are not being approved. 
(d) Structural Deformation: Acceptance Criteria are discussed in Appendix A, 
"Evaluation of Fuel Assembly Structural Response to Externally Applied 
Forces." 
(e) Rupture and Flow Blockage (Ballooning): Zircaloy rupture and flow blockage 
models are part of the ECCS evaluation model and should be reviewed b y CPB. 
The models are empirical and should be compared with relevant data . Exam-
ples of such data and previous reviews are contained in References 10, 12 , 
and 13. 
( f) Fuel Rod Pressure : The thermal performance code for cal culating tempera-
tures discussed in paragraph (a) above should be used to calculate fuel 
r od pressures in conformance with fuel damage criteria of Subsection 
II.A.1, paragraph (f) . The reviewer should ensure that conservatisms that 
were incorporated for calculating temperatures do not introduce nonconser-
vatisms with regard to fuel rod pressures. 
(g) Metal / Water Reaction Rate : To meet the requirements of #mAppendix K#m of 
10 CFR Part 50 (Ref. 9) as it relates to metal / water reaction rate, the 
rate of energy release, hydrogen generation, and c ladding oxidation from 
the metal / water reaction should be calculated using the Baker-Just equ-
ation (Ref. 27). For non-LOCA applications, other correlations may be used 
if justified. 
(h) Fission Product Inventory: To meet the guidelines of Regulatory Guides 
1.3, 1.4, 1 .25 and 1.77 (Refs. 6, 28-30) as they relate to fission pro 
duct release, the available radioactive fission product inventory in fuel 
rods (i.e., the gap inventory) is presently specified by the assumptions 
in those Regulatory Guides. These assumptions should be used until impro-
ved calculational methods are approved by CPB ( see Ref. 31 ) . 
(please press Space to continue) ' ). 
topic 'Appendix K' . 
text is read (' app_k .ws'). 
write (con: ,?text). 
do ('I.B . 3.c Analytical Predictions'). 
end. 
end . 
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topic 'I.B.4 Testing, Inspection , and Surveillance Plans' . 
say (' 
4.2.II.D Testing, Inspection, and Surveillance Plans 
Plans must be reviewed for each plant for testing and inspection of new fuel 
and for monitoring and surveillance of irradiated fuel. 
(please press Space to continue) '). 
end. 
topic ' I.B .4 .a Testing and Inspection of New Fuel' . 
say (' 
4 .2. II.D.1 Testing and Inspection of New Fuel 
Testing and inspection plans for new fuel should include verification of clad-
ding integrity, fuel system dimensions, fuel enrichment, burnable poison con-
centration, and absorber composition . Details of the manufacturer ' 's testing 
and inspection programs should be documented in qualit y control reports, which 
should referenced and summarized in the Safety Analysis Report. The program 
for onsite inspection of new fuel and control assemblies after they have been 
delivered to the plant should also be described. Where the overall testing and 
inspection programs are essentially the same as f or previously approved plants, 
a statement to that effect should be made. In that case, the details of the 
programs need not be included in the Safety Analysis Report, but an appropri-
ate reference should be c ited and a (tabular) summary s hould be presented. 
(please press Space to continue)' ) . 
end. 
topic 'I.B.4.b On- line Fuel System Monitoring'. 
say (' 
4.2.II.D.2 On-line Fuel System Monitoring 
The applicant''s on-line fuel rod failure detect ion methods should be revi-
ewed. Both the sensitivity of the instruments and the applicant''s commitment 
to use the instruments should be evaluated. References 32 and 33 evaluate 
several common detection methods and should be utilized in this review. 
Surveillance is also needed t o assure that B4C control rods are not l osing 
react i vity . Boron compounds are susceptible to leaching in the event of a 
c ladding defect . Periodic reactivity worth tests such as described in Refer-
ence 34 are acceptable . 
(please press Space to continue)') . 
end. 
topic 'I.B.4.c Post- irradiation Surveillance'. 
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say (' 
4.2.II.D.3 Post-irradiation Surveillance 
A pos t-irradiation fuel surveillance program should be described for each 
plant to detect anomalies or confirm expected fuel performance. The extent of 
an acceptable program will depend on the history of the fuel design being con-
sidered, i.e., whether the proposed fuel design is the same as current opera-
ting fuel or incorporates new design features. 
For a fuel design like that in other operating plants, a minimum acceptable 
program should include a qualitative visual examination of some dischar ged 
fuel assemblies from each refueling. Such a program should be sufficient to 
identify gross problems of structural integrity, fuel rod failure, rod bowing, 
or crud deposition. There should also be a commitment in the program to 
perform additional surveillance if unusual behavior is noticed in the visual 
examination or if plant instrumentation indicates gross fuel failure s. The 
surveillance program should address the disposition of failed fuel. 
In addition to the plant-specific surveillance program, there should exists a 
of fuel 
the ab-
continuing fuel surveillance effort for a given type, make, 
that can be suitably referenced by all plants using similar 
sence of such a generic program, the reviewer should expect 
the plant-specific program. 
or class 
fuel. If 
more detail in 
For a fuel design that introduces new features, a more detailed surveillance 
program commensurate with the nature of the changes should be described. This 
program should include appropriate qualitative and quantitative inspections to 
be carried out at interim and end-of-life refueling outages. This surveillance 
program should be coordinated with prototype testing discussed in subsection 
II.C.2. When prototype testing cannot be performed, a special detailed surve-
illance program should be planned for the first irradiation of a new design. 
(please press Space to continue)'). 
end. 
topic 'I.C Review Procedures'. 
say (' 
4.2.III Review Procedures 
For construction permit (CP) applications, the review should assure that the 
design bases set forth in the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) meet 
the acceptance criteria given in #mSubsection II.A#m. The CP review should 
further determine from a study of the preliminary fuel system design that 
there is reasonable assurance that t he final fuel system design will meet the 
design bases. This j udgment may be based on experience with similar designs. 
For operating license (OL) applications, the review should confirm that the 
design bases set forth in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FS AR ) meet the 
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acceptance criteria given in Subsection II.A and that the final fuel system 
design meets the design bases. 
Much of the fuel system review is generic and is not repeated for each similar 
plant . That is, the reviewer will have reviewed the fuel design or certain 
aspects of the fuel design in previous PSARs, FSARs, and licensing topical 
reports. All previous reviews on which the current review is dependent should 
be referenced so that a completely documented safety evaluation is contained 
in the plant safety evaluation report. In particular, the NRC safety evalu-
ation reports for all relevant licensing topical reports should be cited. Cer-
tain generic reviews have also been performed by CPB reviewers with findings 
issued as NUREG- or WASH-series reports. At the present time these reports 
include References 9, 11, 21, 31, 32, 35, and 36, and they should all be 
appropriately cited in the plant safety evaluation report. Applicable Regula-
tory Guides (Refs. 6, 22, 28-30, and 41) should also be mentioned in the plant 
safety evaluation reports. De viation from these guides or positions should be 
explained. After briefly discussing related previous reviews, the plant safety 
evaluation should concentrate on areas where the applications is not identical 
to previously reviewed and approved applications and areas related to newly 
discovered problems. 
An~lytical predictions discussed in #mSubsection II.C.3#m will be reviewed in 
RSARs, FSARs , or licensing topical reports . When the methods are being revi-
ewed, calculations by the staff may be performed to verify the adequacy of the 
analytical methods. Thereafter, audit calculations will not usually be perfor-
med to check the results of an approved method that has been submitted in a 
Safety Analysis Report . Calculations, benchmarking exercises, and additional 
reviews of generic methods may be undertaken, however, at any time the clear 
need arises to reconfirm the adequacy of the method. 
(please press Space to continue)'). 
topic 'Subsection II.A '. 
say (' 
This is part 4.2.II.A Design Bases 
(please press Space t o continue )') 
and do ('I.C Review Procedures'). 
end. 
topic 'Subsection II.C.3'. 
say (' 
This is part 4.2.II.C.3 Analytical Predictions 
(please press Space to continue)' ) 
and do (' I.C Review Procedures'). 
end . 
end. 
topic ' I.D Evaluation Findings '. 
say (' 
4.2 . IV Evaluation Findings 
The reviewer should verify that sufficient infor mation has been provided to 
satisfy the requirements of this SRP section and that the evaluation supports 
conclusions of the following t ype, t o be included in the staff ' ' s safet y 
evaluation report : 
The staff concludes that the fuel system of the ------------- plant has been 
designed so that ( a ) the fuel system will not be damaged as a result of normal 
operation and antic ipated operational occurrences, (b) fuel damage during pos -
tulated accidents would not be severe enough t o prevent control rod insertion 
when i t is required, and (c) core coolability will always be maintained, even 
after severe postulated accidents and thereby meets the related requirements 
of 10 CFR Part 50, &50.46; 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 
10, 27, and 35; 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K; and 10 CFR Part 100 . Thi s conclu-
sion is based on the following : 
1 . The applicant has provided suffic ient evidence that these design 
objectives will be met based on operating experience, prototype 
testing, and analytical predictions . Those analytical predictions 
dealing with structural response, control rod ejection (PWR) or drop 
(BWR) , and fuel densification have been perfor med in accordance with 
(a ) the guidelines of Regulator y Guides 1 .60, 1.77 , and 1 . 126, or 
methods that the staff has reviewed and f ound t o be acceptable 
alternatives to those Regulator y Guides, and (b ) the guidelines f or 
"Evaluation of Fuel Assembly Structural Response to Externally 
Applied Forces" in Appendix A to SRP Section 4 . 2 . 
2. The appli cant has provided for testing and inspection of new fuel to 
insure that it is within de s ign t olerance s at the time of core 
loading . The applicant has made a commitment to perform on-line fuel 
failure monitoring and postirradiation surveillance to detect ano-
malies or confirm that the fuel has performed as expected . 
The staff concludes that the applicant has des cribed methods of adequately 
predic ting fuel r od failures during postulated acc idents so that radioactivity 
releases are not underestimated and thereby meets the related requirements of 
10 CFR Part 100. In meeting these requirements, the applicant has (a) used the 
fission-product release assumptions of Regulatory Guides 1.3 ( or 1 . 4 ) , 1 .25, 
and 1 . 77 and (b ) performed the analysis f or fuel rod fai lures for the rod 
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ejection accident in accordance with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.77 
or with methods that the staff has reviewed and found to be an acceptable 
alternative to Regulatory Guide 1.77. 
(please press Space to continue)'). 
end. 
topic 'I.E Implementation'. 
say (' 
4.2.V Implementation 
The following is intended to provide guidance to applicants and licensees 
regarding the NRC staff' 's plans for using this SRP section. 
Except in those cases in which the applicant proposes an acceptable alterna-
tive method for complying with specified portions of the Cornrnission '' s regu-
lations, the method described herein will be used by the staff in its evalu-
ation of conformance with Commission regulations. 
Implementation schedules for conformance to parts of the method discussed 
herein are contained in the referenced regulatory guides and NUREGs. 
(please press Space to continue)'). 
end. 
topic ' I.F References'. 
say (' 
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(please press Space to continue)' ). 
end . 
topic ' I . G Appendix'. 
say (' 
4 .2.VII Appendix 
EVALUATION OF FUEL ASSEMBLY STRUCTURAL RESPONSE 
TO EXTERNALLY APPLIED FORCES 
TO 
STANDARD REVIEW PLAN SECTION 4.2 
A. BACKGROUND 
Earthquakes and postulated pipe breaks in the reactor coo lant system would 
result in external forces on the fuel assembly. SRP Section 4.2 states that 
fuel system coolability should be maintained and that damage should not be so 
severe as to prevent control rod insertion when required during these low 
probability accidents. This Appendix describes the review that should be 
performed of the fuel assembly structural response to seismic and LOCA l oads. 
Background material for this Appendix is given in References 37-40. 
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B. ANALYSIS OF LOADS 
1. Input 
Input for the fuel assembly structural analysis comes from results of the 
primary coolant system and reactor internals structural analysis, which is 
reviewed by the Mechanical Engineering Branch. Input for the fuel assembly 
response to a LOCA should include (a) motions of the cor plate, core 
shroud, fuel alignment plate, or other relevant structures; these motions 
should correspond to the break that produced the peak fuel assembly 
loadings in the primary coolant system and reactor internals analysis, and 
(b) transient pressure differences that apply loads directly to the fuel 
assembly. If the earthquake loads are large enough to produce a non-linear 
fuel assembly response, input for the seismic analysis should use structure 
motions corresponding to the reactor primary coolant s ys tem analysis for 
the SSE; if a linear response is produced, a spectral analysis may be used 
in accordance with the guidelines of Regulat or y Guide 1.60 (Ref . 41). 
2 . Methods 
Analytical methods used in performing structural response analyses should 
be reviewed. Justification should be supplied to show that the numerical 
solution techniques are appropriate. 
Linear and non-linear structural representations (i.e., the modeling) 
should also be reviewed. Experimental verification of the analytical repre-
sentation of the fuel assembly components should be provided when practical 
A sample problem of a simplified nature should be worked by the applicant 
and compared by the reviewer with either hand calculations or results gene-
rated by the reviewer with an independent code (Ref . 38). Although the 
sample problem should use a structural representation that is as close as 
possible to the design in question (and, therefore, would vary from one 
vendor to another), simplifying assumptions may be made (e.g., one might 
use a 3-assembly core region with continuous sinusoidal input ). 
The sample problem should be designed to exercise various features of the 
code and reveal their behavior . The sample problem comparison is not, 
however, designed to show that one code is more conservative than another, 
but rather to alert the reviewer to major discrepancies so that an explana-
tion can be sought. 
3. Uncertainty Allowances 
The fuel assembly structural models and analytical methods are probably 
conservative and input parameters are also conservative. However, to ensure 
that the fuel assembly analysis does not introduce any non-conservatisms, 
two precautions should be taken: (a) If it is not explicitly evaluated, 
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impact loads from the PWR LOCA analysis should be increased (by about 30%) 
to account for a pressure pulse, which is associated with steam flashing 
that affects only the PWR fuel assembly analysis . (b) Conservative margin 
should be added if any part of the analysis (PWR or BWR) exhibits pronoun-
ced sensitivity to input variations. 
Variations in resultant loads should be determined for +-10% variations in 
input amplitude and frequency ; variations in amplitude and frequency should 
be made separately, not simultaneously . A factor should be developed for 
resultant load magnitude variations of more than 15% . For example, if +-10% 
variations in input magnitude or frequency produce a maximum resultant 
increase of 35%, the sensitivity factor would be 1.2. Since resonances and 
pronounced sensitivities may be plant - dependent, the sensitivity analysis 
should be performed on a plant-by-plant basis until the reviewer is confi-
dent that further sensitivity analyses are unnecessary or it is otherwise 
demonstrated that the analyses performed are bounding. 
4. Audit 
Independent audit calculations for a t ypical full-sized core should be per-
formed by the reviewer to verify that the overall structural representation 
is adequate. An independent audit code (Ref. 38) should be used for this 
audit during the generic review of the analytical methods. 
5. Combination of loads 
To meet the requirements of #mGeneral Design 2#m as it relates to combining 
loads, an appropriate combination of loads from natural phenomena and acci-
dent conditions must be made . Loads on fuel assembly component should be 
calculated for each input (i.e., seismic and LOCA) as described above in 
Paragraph 1, and the resulting loads should be added by the square-root-of-
sum-of-squares (SRSS) method. These combined loads should be compared with 
the component strengths described in Section C according to the acceptance 
criteria in Section D. 
C. DETERMINATION OF STRENGTH 
1. Grids 
All modes of loading (e.g., in-grid and through-grid loadings) should be 
considered, and the most damaging mode should be represented in the ven-
dor'' s laboratory grid strength tests. Test procedures and results should 
be reviewed to assure that the appropriate failure mode is being predicted. 
The review should also confirm that (a) the testing impact velocities cor-
respond to expected fuel assembly velocities, and (b) the crushing load 
P(crit) has been suitably selected from the load-vs-deflection curves. 
Because of the potential for different test rigs to introduce measurement 
variations, an evaluation of the grid strength test equipment will be inc-
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luded as part of the review of the te s t procedure. 
The consequences of grid def or mation are small. Gros s def ormation of grids 
in many PWR assemblies would be needed t o interfere with control r od inser -
tion during an SSE (i.e., buckling of a few isolated grids could not dis-
place guide tubes significantly from their proper location), and grid 
deformation (without channel deflection) would not affect control blade 
insertion in a BWR. In a LOCA, gross def ormation of the hot channel in 
either a PWR or a BWR would result in only small increases in peak cladding 
temperature . Therefore, average values are appropriate, and the allowable 
crushing load P(crit) should be the 95/. confidence level on the true mean 
as taken from the distribution of measurements on unirradiated production 
grids at (or corrected to ) operating temperature . While P(crit ) will incre -
ase with irradiation , ductility will be reduced . The extra margin in 
P(crit) for irradiated grids is thus assumed t o offset the unknown def or-
mation behavior of irradiated grids beyond P(crit ) . 
2. Component s Other than Grids 
Strength of fuel assembly components other than spacer grids may be deduced 
from fundamental material properties or experimentation. Supporting evi-
dence for strength values should be supplied . Since structural failure of 
these components (e.g., fracturing of guide tubes or fragmentation of fuel 
r ods) could be more serious than grid deformation, allowable values should 
bound a large percentage (about 95/.) of the distribution of component 
strengths. Therefore, ASME Boiler and Pressure Ves sel Code values and pro-
cedures may be used where appropriate f or determining yield and ultimate 
s trengths . Specification of allowable values may f oll ow the ASME Code requ-
irements and should include con siderat ion of buckling and fatigue effects . 
D. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 
1 . Loss-of-Coolant Acc ident 
Two principal criteria apply for the LOCA: (a) fuel rod fragmentati on must 
not occur as a direct re sult of t he blowdown l oads, and (b) the 10 CFR Part 
50, &50 .46 temperature and oxidation limits must not be exceeded. The first 
criterion is satisfied if the combined l oads on the fuel rods and compo-
nents other than grids remain below the allowable values defined above. The 
second criterion is satisfied by an ECCS analysis . If combined loads on the 
grids remain below P(crit ) , as defined above , then no significant distor-
tion of the fuel assembly would occur and the usual ECCS analysis is suffi -
cient . If combined grid loads exceed P( crit) , then grid deformation must be 
assumed and the ECCS analysis must include the effects of distorted fuel 
assemblies. An assumption of maximum credible def or mation (i.e., f ully col-
lapsed grids ) may be made unless other as sumptions are justified . 
Control rod insertability is a third criterion that must be satisfied. 
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Loads from the worst-case LOCA that requires control r od insertion must be 
combined with the SSE loads, and control rod insertability must be demons-
trated for that combined load. For a PWR, if combined loads on the grids 
remain below P(crit) as defined above, then significant deformation of the 
fuel assembly would not occur and control rod insertion would not be inter-
fered with by lateral displacement of the guide tubes. If combined loads on 
the grids exceed P(crit ), then additional analysis is needed to show that 
deformation is not severe enough to prevent control r od insertion. 
For a BWR, several conditions must be met t o demonstrate control blade 
insertability: (a) combined loads on the channel box must remain below the 
allowable value defined above for components other that grids; otherwise, 
additional analysis is needed to show that deformati on is not severe enough 
to prevent control blade insertion, and (b) vertical liftoff forces must 
not unseat the lower tieplate from the fuel support piece such that the 
resulting loss of lateral fuel bundle positioning could interfere with c on-
trol blade insertion . 
2. Safe Shutdown Earthquake 
Two criteria apply for the SSE: (a) fuel r od fragmentation must not occur 
as a result of the seismic loads, and (b) control rod insertability must be 
assured . The first criterion is satisfied by the criteria in Paragraph 1. 
The second criterion must be satisfied for SSE l oads alone if no analysis 
for combined loads is required by Paragraph 1 . 
(please press Space to continue)') . 
end. 
topic 'I I Nuclear Design' . 
ask (' 
4.3 NUCLEAR DESIGN 
REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES 
Primary - Core Performance Branch (CPB) 
Secondary - None 
This part contains:', part, 
[ 
'4.3. I Areas of Review ', 
'4.3 .II Ac ceptance Criteria', 
'4.3.III Review Procedures ', 
'4.3 IV Evaluation Finding ' , 
'4.3 V Implementation ' , 
'4 .3 VI References ' , 
' 4.3 VII Appendix' , 
' Content', 
'Index', 
'Opening Menu']). 
do (?part). 
end. 
topic 'II.A Areas of Review'. 
say (' 
4.3.I Areas of Review 
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The review of the nuclear design of the fuel assemblies, control systems, and 
reactor core is carried out to aid in confirming that fuel design limits will 
not be exceeded during normal operation or antic ipated operational transients, 
and that the effects of postulated react i vity accidents will not cause signi-
fi cant damage to the reactor coolant pressure boundary or impair the capabi-
lity to cool the core and to assure conformance with the requirements of 
#mGeneral Design Criteria 10, 11, 12, 13 , 20, 25, 26, 27, and 28#m. 
The review of the nuclear design under this SRP section, the review of the 
fuel system design under #mSRP Section 4.2#m, the review of the thermal and 
h ydraulic design under #mSRP Section 4.4#m, and the review of the transient 
anq accident analyses under the SRP section for Chapter 15 of the applicant ' 's 
safety analysis report (S AR), are all necessary in order to confirm that the 
requirements defined abo ve are met. 
The specific areas of interest in the nuclear design include: 
1 . Confirmation that design bases are established as required by the appro-
priate General Design Criteria. 
2. The areas concerning core power distribution. These are : 
a. The presentation of expected or possible power distributions including 
normal and extreme cases for steady-state and allowed l oad- follow tran-
sients and covering a full range of reactor conditions of time in cycle, 
allowed control rod positions, and possible fuel burnup dis tributions. 
b. The presentation of the core power di s tributions as axial, radial, and 
local distributions and peaking factors to be used in the transient and 
accident analyses. The effects of phenomena such as fuel densification 
should be included in these distri butions and factors. 
c. The translation of t he design power distributions into operating power 
distributions, including instrument -calculation correlations, operating 
procedures and measurements, and necessary limits on these operations . 
d. The requirements for instruments , the calibration and cal culations 
involved in their use, and the uncertainties involved in translation of 
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instrument readings into power dist ribut i ons. 
e . Limits and setpoints f or actions, alarms , or scr am f or the ins trument 
s ystems and demonstrat ion that t hese systems can maintain the reactor 
within de s ign power distribution l imits. 
f . Measurements in previous reactors and critical e xperiments and their us e 
in the uncertainty analyses , and measurements t o be made on the reactor 
under review, including startup confirmator y tes t s and periodically 
required measurements . 
g. The trans lation of design limits, uncertainties , operat i ng l i mits , i n s -
trument requirement s, and setpoints into technical spe cifications . 
3. The areas concerning react iv i t y coeff i ents. The s e are : 
a . The applic ant ' ' s presentation of calculated nominal values f or the re ac-
t ivity coefficients such a s the moderator coefficient, whi ch invol ves 
primarily effects fr om densit y changes and t akes the f or m of tempera-
ture , void, or densit y coeff i c ients; the Doppl er coeffic ient ; and power 
coeffic ients . The range of react or s tates to be covered includes the 
entire operating range from co ld shutdown through full power, and t he 
e xtremes reached in transient and accident analyses . It includes the 
e xtremes of time in cycle and an appropriate range of control r od inser-
tions f or the reactor states . 
b . The applicant '' s presentat ion of uncertainty analyses f or nominal values 
including the magnitude of the uncertainty and t he justification of t he 
magnitude by e xamination of the accuracy of the methods used in calcula-
t i ons (SAR Section 4 .3.3), and comparison where possible with react or 
experiment s. 
c. The applicant ' ' s c ombination of nominal va l ues and unc ertaint i es t o pr o-
vide sui tably conservati ve values for use i n reac t or s teady-state ana-
l ys i s (primarily control requirements, SAR Se ction 4.3.2.4) , s tabil i ty 
analyses (SAR Section 4. 3 .2.8) , and the transient and accident analyses 
presented i n SAR Chapter 15 . 
4. The areas concerning reac t ivity control requirements and control provi s i -
ons . These are : 
a. The control requirements and provis ions f or control nec essary t o compen-
sate fo r l ong-term reactivit y changes of the core . These reactivity 
changes occur becaus e of deplet ion of t he fissile material in the fuel , 
depletion of burnable poison in some of the fue l r ods , and bui ldup of 
fission products and transuraniwn isot opes. 
b. The control requirements and provi s i ons f or control needed t o compens at e 
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for the reactivity change caused by changing the temperature of the 
reactor from the hot, zero power condition to the cold shutdown condi-
tion . 
c. The control requirements and provisions for control needed to compensate 
for the reactivity effects caused by changing the reactor power level 
from full power to zero power . 
d. The control requirements and provisions for control needed to compensate 
for the effects on the power distribution of the high cross-section 
Xe-135 isotope. 
e. The adequacy of the control systems to assure that the reactor can be 
returned to and maintained in the cold shutdown condition at any time 
during operation. 
f. The applicant''s analysis and experimental basis for determining the 
reactivity worth of a "stuck" control rod of highest worth . 
g. The provision of two independent control systems. 
5. The areas of control rod patterns and reactivity worths . These are : 
a . Descriptions and figures indicating the control rod pattern expected to 
be used throughout a fuel cycle. This includes operation of single rods 
or of groups or banks of rods, rod withdrawal order, and insertion 
limits as a function of power and core life . 
b . Descriptions of allowable deviations from the patterns indicated above, 
such as for misaligned rods, stuck rods, or rod positions used for spa-
tial power shaping. 
c. Descriptions, tables, and figures of the maximum worths of individual 
rods or banks as a function of position for power and cycle life condi-
tions appropriate to rod withdrawal transients and rod ejection or drop 
accidents . Descriptions and curves of maximum rates of reactivity incre-
ase associated with rod withdrawals, experimental confirmation of rod 
worths or other factors justifying the reactivity increase rates used in 
control rod accident analyses, and equipment, administrative procedures, 
and alarms which may be employed to restrict potential rod worths should 
be included. 
d . Descriptions and graphs of scram reactivity as a function of time after 
scram initiation and other pertinent parameters, including methods for 
calculating the scram reactivity. 
6 . The area of criticality of fuel assemblies . Discussions and tables giving 
values of Keff for single assemblies and groups of adjacent fuel assemblies 
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up to the number required for criticality, assuming the assemblies are dry 
and also immersed in water, are reviewed. 
7. The areas concerning analytical methods. These are: 
a. Description of the analytical methods used in the nuclear design, inclu-
ding those for predicting criticality, reactivity coefficients, burnup, 
and stability. 
b. The data base used for neutron cross-sections and other nuclear para-
meters. 
c. Verification of the analytical methods by comparison with measured data. 
8. The areas concerning pressure vessel irradiation. These are: 
a. Neutron flux spectrum above 1 MeV in the core, at the core boundaries, 
and at the inside pressure vessel wall. 
b. Assumptions used in the calculations; these include the power level, the 
use factor, the type of fuel cycle considered, and the design life of 
the vessel. 
c. Computer codes used in the analysis. 
d. The data base for fast neutron cross sections. 
e. The geometric modeling of the reactor, support barrel, water annulus, 
and pressure vessel. 
f. Uncertainties in the calculation. 
9. The adequacy of limits on power distribution during normal operation is 
reviewed in connection with review of the thermal-hydraulic design under 
#mSRP Section 4.4#m. 
10 The adequacy of proposed instrumentation to meet the requirements for main-
taining the reactor operating state within defined limits is reviewed under 
SRP Section 7.1 through 7.6. 
(please press Space to continue)') . 
end. 
topic 'II.B Acceptance Criteria'. 
say (' 
4.3.II Acceptance Criteria 
The acceptance criteria in the area of nuclear design are based on meeting the 
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relevant requirements of the General Design Criteria (GDC) related t o the 
reactor core and reactivity control system (Ref . 1) . The relevant requirements 
are as follows : 
A. GDC 10 requires that acceptable fuel design limits be specified that are 
not to be exceeded during normal operation, including the effects of anti-
cipated operational occurrences. 
B. GDC 11 requires that in the power operating range , the prompt inherent nuc-
lear feedback characteristics tend to compensate for a rapid i ncrease in 
reactivity. 
C. GDC 12 requires that power oscillations which could result in conditions 
exceeding specified ac ceptable fuel design limits are nor possible or can 
be reliably and readily detected and suppressed . 
D. GDC 13 requires provision of instrumentation and controls to monitor vari-
ables and systems that can affect the fissi on process over anticipated 
ranges for normal operation, anticipated operationa occurences and accident 
conditions, and to maintain the variables and systems wi thin prescribed 
operating ranges . 
E . GDC 20 requires automatic initiation of the reactivit y control systems to 
assure that a cceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded a s a result of 
anticipated operational occurrences and to assure automatic operation of 
systems and components important to safety under accident conditions. 
F. GDC 25 requires that no single malfunction of the reactivity control sys tem 
(this does not include rod ejection or dropout ) cause s violat i on of the 
acceptable fuel design limits. 
G. GDC 26 requires that two independent reactivity control systems of diffe-
rent design be provided, and that each system have the capability to con-
trol the rate of reactivity changes resulting from planned, normal power 
changes . One of the systems must be capable of reliably controlling antici-
pated operational occurrences. In addition , one of the systems must be 
capable of holding the react or core subcritical under cold conditions. 
H. GDC 27 requires that the reactivity control systems have a combined capabi-
lity, in conjunction with poison addition by the emergency core cooling 
s ystem, of reliably controlling reactivity changes under postulated acci-
dent conditions, with appropriate margin f or stuck rods. 
I. GDC 28 requires that the effects of postulated reactivity accidents neither 
result in damage to the reac t or coolant pressure boundary greater than 
limited local yielding, nor cause sufficient damage to impair significantly 
the capability to cool the core. 
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The following discussions present less f ormal criteria and guidelines used in 
the review of the nuclear design f or meeting the relevant requirements of the 
GDCs identified above. 
1 . There are no direct or e xplicit criteria f or the power densities and power 
distributions allowed during (and at the limits of) normal operation, 
either steady-state or load-following . These limits are determined from an 
integrated consideration of fuel limits (SAR Section 4.2), thermal limit 
(SAR Section 4.4), scram limits (SAR Chapter 7) and transient and ac cident 
analyses (SAR Chapter 15 ). The de s ign limits f or power densities (and thus 
for peaking factors) during normal operation should be such that a cceptable 
fuel design limits are not e xceeded during anticipated transients and that 
other limits, such as the 2200F peak cladding temperature allowed for l oss-
of -coolant ac cidents ( LO CA), are not exceeded during design basis accident . 
The limiting power distributions are then determined such that the limits 
on power densities and peaking factors can be maintained in operation . 
These limiting power distributions ma y be maintained (i. e., not e xceeded) 
administratively (i.e. , not by automatic scrams) , provided a suitabl e 
demonstration is made that sufficient, properly translated infor mation and 
alarms are available from the react or instrumentation to keep the operator 
i nf ormed . 
The acceptance criteria in the area of power distribution are that the 
i nformation presented should satisfactorily demonstrate that: 
a. A reasonable probability exists that the proposed de s ign limits can be 
met within the expec ted operational range of the reactor, taking i nt o 
account the analytic al methods and data for the design c alculations; 
unc ertainty analyses and experimental comparisons presented f or the 
design calculations; the sufficiency of design cases calculated covering 
times in cycle, rod positions, load-follow t ransients, etc.; and special 
problems such as power s pikes due to densification, poss ible asymme-
tries, and misaligned r ods . 
b. A reas onable probabi l ity exists that in nor mal operation the design 
limits will n ot be exceeded, based on consi derat i on of i nfor mation rece-
ived fr om the power d is tribution monitoring instrumentation; the proces-
sing of that information, including cal cul ations involved in the proces -
sing; the requirements f or periodic check measurements; the accuracy of 
design c alculations used in developing correlations when primary vari-
ables are not directly measured; the uncertainty analyses for the i nfor-
mation alarms for the limit s of normal operation (e.g., offset limits, 
control bank limits) and f or abnormal situat ions (e.g . , tilt alarms f or 
control r od misalignment ). 
Criteria for acceptable values and uses of uncertainties in operation, ins-
trumentation numerical requirements, limit settings for alarms or scram, 
fr equency and extent of power distribution measurements, and use of excore 
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and incore instruments and related correlations and limits for offsets and 
tilts, all var y with reactor t ype . They can be f ound in staff safety e valu-
ation reports and in appropriate sections of the technical specifications 
and accompanying bases f or react or s s imilar t o the reac tor under review . 
The CPB has enunciated Branch Technical Position CPB 4. 3- 1 f or Westinghouse 
reactors which employ constant axial offset control (Ref. 2) . 
Acceptance criteria for power spike models can be f ound in a staff techni-
cal report on fuel densification (Ref. 3). 
Generally , special or newly emphasized problems related t o core power dis -
tributions will not be a direc t part of nor mal r eviews but will be handled 
in special generic re views . Fuel densification effects and the related 
power spiking and the use of uncertainties in de s ign limits are examples 
of these areas . 
2. The only directly applicable GDC in the area of reactivit y coefficients is 
GDC 11, which states " . .. the net effect of the prompt inherent nuclear 
feedback characteristics tend t o compensate f or a rapid increase in reac-
tivit y " , and is considered t o be satisfied in light water reac t ors by the 
existence of the Doppler and negative power coeffic ients. There are no cri-
teria that explic itly establish acceptable ranges of coefficient val ues or 
preclude the acc eptability of a positive moderator temperature coeff icient 
such as may exist in pressurized water reactors at beginning of core life . 
The acceptability of the coeffic ients in a part i cular case in det ermined in 
the reviews of the analyses in which the y are us ed, e . g. , control require-
ment analyses, stabilit y analyses, and transient and acc ident analyses. The 
use of spat i al effects such as weighting approx i mations as appropriate f or 
individual transients are inc luded i n the analysi s reviews. The j udgment t o 
be made under this SRP sec tion is whether the reactivity coefficients have 
been assigned suitably conservative values by the applicant. The basis for 
that judgment includes the use to be made of a coeffic ient , i.e., the ana-
l yses in which i t is impor t ant; the state of the art for the coeffic ient; 
the uncertaint y as s oc iated with such calculations ; e xperimental checks of 
the coeffic ient in operating reac t ors; and any required checks of the coef-
ficient i n the startup program of the reactor under revi ew. 
3. Acceptanc e criteria relative t o control r od patterns and reactivity worths 
include : 
a. The predicted control r od worths and reactivit y insertion rates must be 
reasonable bounds t o values that ma y o#cur in the reactor. These values 
are used in the trans i ent and acc ident analyses and judgment as t o the 
adequacy of the uncert aint y allowances are made in the review of the 
transient and ac cident anal ys e s. 
b . Equipment, operating limit s, and procedures necessary t o restric t poten-
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tial rod worths or reacti vity insertion rates should be shown to be 
capable of performing these functions . It is a CPB position to require, 
where feasible, an alarm when any limit or restriction is violated or is 
about to be violated. 
4. There are no specific criteria t~at must be met by the analytical methods 
or data that are used by an applicant or reactor vendor. In general, the 
analytical methods and data base should be representative of the state of 
the art, and the experiments used to validate the analytical methods should 
be adequate and encompass a sufficient range . 
(please press Space to continue )'). 
end . 
topic ' II . C Review Procedures '. 
say (' 
4 .3. III Review Procedures 
The review procedures below apply in general t o both the construction permit 
(CP) and operating licence (OL) stage reviews . At the CP stage, parameter 
values and certain design aspects may be preliminary and subject to change. At 
the OL stage, final values of parameters should be used in the analyses pre-
sented in the SAR. The review of the nuclear design of a plant is based on the 
information provided by the applicant in the safety analyses report, as amen-
ded, and in meetings and discussions with the applicant and his contractors 
and consultants. This review in s ome cases will be supplemented by independent 
calculations performed by the staff or staff consultants. Files of audit cal-
culations are maintained by CPB f or reference by the reviewer. 
1. The reviewer confirms, as part of the review of specific areas of the nuc-
lear design outlined below, that the design bases, design features, and 
design limits are established in conformance with the GDCs listed in sub-
section II of this SRP section. 
2. The reviewer examines the information presented in the SAR to determine 
that the core power distributions for the reactor can reasonably be expec-
ted to fall within the design limits throughout all normal ( steady-state 
and load-follow) operations, and that the instrument systems employed, 
along with the information processing systems and alarms, will reasonably 
assure that the maintenance of the distributions within these limits for 
normal operation. 
For a normal review, many areas related to core power distribution will 
have been examined in generic reviews or earlier reviews of reactors with 
generally s imilar core characteristics and instrument systems. A large part 
of the review on a particular case may then involve comparisons with infor-
mation from previous application reviews. The comparisons may involve the 
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shapes and peaking fact ors of normal and limi ting distributions over the 
range of operating states of the reactor, the effects of power spikes from 
densification , assigned unc ertainties and the ir use, cal culation methods 
and data used, correlations used in contr ol processes, instrumentation 
requirements, information processing methods including computer use, set-
points f or operational limits and alarm limits, and alarm limits f or abnor-
malities such as flux asymmetries . 
An important part of this review, at the OL s tage, covers the relevant sec-
tions of t he proposed technical specifications, where power distributions 
and related contr ols such as control rod limits are discussed. Here the 
instrument requirements, limit settings , and measurement frequencies and 
requirements are set forth in full detail. The comparison of technica l spe-
cifications should reveal any differences between essentially identical 
reactors or any lack of difference between reac t ors with changed core cha-
racteristics . Where these occur , the reviewer mus t assess the significance 
and validity of the differences or lack of differences. 
This review and comparison may be supplemented with examinations of related 
topical reports from reactor vendors, generic studies by staff consultants, 
and startup reports from operating reactors which contain i nformation on 
measured power distributions . 
3. The reviewer determines from the applicant' 's presentations that suitably 
conservative reactivit y coefficients have been developed f or use in reactor 
analyses such as those f or control requirements , s tability , and transients 
and a cc)dents . The re viewer examines: 
a . The applicability and accuracy of methods used for calculations inclu-
ding the use of more accurate check calculat ions. 
b. The models involved in the calculations such as the model used for 
effective fuel temperature in Doppler coefficient analyses . 
c. The react or state conditions assumed in determining values of the coef-
ficients. For example , the pressurized water reactor (PWR) moderator 
temperature coefficient t o be used i n the steam lime break analysis is 
usually based on the reactor condition at end of cycle with all contr ol 
rods inserted except the most reactive r od, and the moderator tempera-
ture in the hot standby range . 
d . The applicability and accuracy of experimental data from critical expe-
riments and operating reactors used t o determine or justify uncertainty 
allowances. Measurements during startup and during the cyc le of mode-
rator temperature coefficients and full power Doppler coefficients in 
the case of PWRs, and results of measurements of transients during star-
tup in the case of boiling water reactors (BWRs ) , should be examined. As 
part of the review, comparisons are made between the values and uncer-
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tainty allowances for reactivit y coefficients for the reactor under 
review and those for similar reactors previously reviewed and approved . 
Generally, many essential areas will have been covered during earlier 
reviews of similar reactors . The reviewer notes any differences in 
results for essentially identical reactors and any lack of differences 
for reactors with changed core characteristics, and judges the signifi-
cance and validity of any differences or lack of differences . 
4. The review procedures in the area of reactivity control requirements and 
control provisions are as follows : 
a. The reviewer determines that two independent reactivity control s ystems 
of different design are provided . 
b . The re viewer examines the tabulation of control requirements, the asso-
ciated uncertainties , and the capability of the control systems, and 
determines by inspection and study of the analyses and experimental data 
that the values are realistic and cons ervat ive. 
c. The re viewer determines that one of the control systems is capable of 
returning the reactor to the co ld shutdown condition and maintaining it 
in this condition, at any time in the cycle . It is necessary that proper 
allowance be made for all of the mechanisms that change the reactivity 
of the core as the reactor is taken from the cold shutdown state to the 
hot, full power operating state. The reviewer should determine that 
proper allowance is made for the decrease in fuel temperature, moderator 
temperature, and the loss of voids (in BWRs) as the reactor goes from 
the power operating range to cold shutdown . 
d . The reviewer determines that one of the control systems is capable of 
rapidly returning the reactor t o the hot standby (shutdo1n1) condition 
from any power level at any time in the cycle . This requirement is met 
by rapid insertion of control r ods in all current light water reactors . 
Proper allowance f or the highest worth control r od being stuck in the 
full-out position must be made. In PWRs, operational reactivity control 
is carried out by movement of control rods and by adjustments of the 
concentration of soluble poison in the coolant. The reviewer must pay 
particular attention to the proposed rod insertion limits in the power 
operating range, to assure that the control r ods are capable of rapidly 
reducing the power and maintaining the reactor in the hot standby condi-
tion. This is an important point because the soluble poison concentra-
tion in the coolant could be decreased in order to raise reactor power, 
while the control rods were left inserted so far that in the event of a 
scram (rapid insertion of control rods), the available reactivity worth 
of the control rods on full insertion would not be enough to shut the 
reactor down to the hot standby condition . 
e. The reviewer determines that each of the independent reactivi t y control 
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systems is capable of controlling the reactivity changes resulting from 
planned, normal power operation. This determination is made by comparing 
the rate of reactivity change resulting from planned, normal operation 
to the capabilities of each of the two control systems. Suffic ient mar-
gin must exist to allow for the uncertainties in the rate . 
5 . The review procedures in the area of control rod patterns and reactivit y 
worths are: 
a. The reviewer determines by inspection and study of the information des-
cribed in subsection I.5 of this SRP section that the control rod and 
bank worts are reasonable . This determination involves evaluation of the 
appropriateness of the analytical models used, the applicability of 
experimental data used to validate the models, and the applicability of 
generic positions or those established in previous reviews of similar 
reactors . 
b. The reviewer determines the equipment, operating restrictions, and admi-
nistrative procedures that are required to restrict possible control rod 
and bank worths, and the e xtent to which the alarm criterion i n subsec-
tion I.3.b of this SRP section is satisfied. If the equipment invol ved 
is subject to frequent downtime, the re viewer must determine if alterna-
tive measures should be provided or the extent of proposed outage time 
is acceptable. 
c. The reviewer will employ the same procedures as in item 5.a, above, to 
evaluate the scram reactivity information described in subsection I.5 of 
this SRP section. The scram reactivity is a property of the reactor 
design and is not easily changed, but if restrictions are necessary the 
procedures in item 5.b, above, can be followed as applicable. 
6 . The information presented on criticality of fuel assemblies is reviewed in 
the context of the applicant''s physics calculations and the ability to 
calculate criticality of a small number of fuel assemblies. This informa-
tion is related to information on fuel storage presented in SAR Section 9.1 
and reviewed under SRP Section 9 . 1 .1 and 9.1.2. The reviewer of SRP Section 
9.1 assumes that teh applicant ''s criticality calculations have been revi-
ewed b y CPB and are acceptable . 
7. The reviewer e xercises professional judgment and experience to ascertain 
the following about the applicant''s analytical methods: 
a. The computer codes used in the nuclear design are described in suffi-
cient detail to enable the reviewer to establish that the theoretical 
bases, assumptions, and numerical approximati ons f or a given code 
reflect the current state of the art. 
b. The source of the neutron cross-sections used in fast and thermal spec-
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trum calculations is described in sufficient detail so that the revi-
ewer can confirm that the cross-sections are comparable to those in the 
current ENDF/ B data files (Ref. 4). If modifications and normalization 
of the cross-section data have been made, the bases used must be deter-
mined to be acceptable. 
c. The procedures used to generate problem-dependent cross-section sets are 
given in sufficient detail so that the reviewer can establish that they 
reflect the state of the art. The reviewer confirms that the methods 
used for the following calculations are of acceptable accuracy: the fast 
neutron spectrum calculation; the computation of the U-238 resonance 
integral and correlation with experimental data; the computation of re-
sonance integrals for other isotopes as appropriate (for example,Pu-240) 
calculation of the Dancoff correction factor for a given fuel lattice; 
the thermal neutron spectrum calculation; the lattice cell calculation 
including fuel rods, control assemblies, lumped burnable poison rods, 
fuel assemblies, and groups of fuel assemblies; and calculations of fuel 
and burnable poison depletion and buildup of fission products and trans-
uranium isotopes. 
d. The gross spatial flux calculations that are used in the nuclear design 
are discussed in sufficient detail so that the reviewer can confirm that 
the following items are adequate to produce results of acceptable accu-
racy; the method of calculation (e.g., diffusion theory, Sn transport 
theory, Monte Carlo, synthesis); the number of energy groups used; the 
number of spatial mesh intervals, when applicable; and the t ype of boun-
dary conditions used, when applicable. 
e. The calculation of power oscillations and stability indices for diame-
tral xenon reactivity transients, axial xenon reactivity transients, 
other possible xenon reactivity transients, and non-xenon-induced reac-
tivity transients, are discussed in sufficient detail so that the revi-
ewer can confirm for each item that the method of calculation (e .g. , 
nodal analysis, diffusion theory, transport theory, synthesis) and the 
number of spatial dimensions used (1, 2, or 3) are acceptable. 
f. Verification of the data base, computer codes, and analysis procedures 
has been made by comparing calculated results with measurements obtained 
from critical experiments and operating reactors. The reviewer ascerta-
ins that the comparisons cover an adequate range for each item and that 
the conclusions of the applicant are acceptable . 
8. The analysis of neutron irradiation of the reactor vessel may be used in 
two ways. It may provide the design basis for establishing the vessel mate-
rial nil-ductility transition temperature as a function of the fluence, 
n vt. Or, it may provide the relative flux spectra at various positions 
between the pressure vessel and the reactor core so that the flux spectra 
for various test specimens may be estimated. This information is used in 
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determining the reactor vessel material surveillance program requirements 
and pressure-temperature limits for operation under SRP Sections 5.3.2 and 
5.3.3. CPB reviews the calculational method, the geometric modeling, and 
the uncertainties in the calculational under this SRP section. The review 
procedures for pressure vessel irradiation include determinations that: 
a. The calculations were performed by higher order theory than diffusion 
theory. 
b. The geometric modeling is detailed enough to properly estimate the rela-
tive flux spectra at various positions from the reactor core boundary to 
the pressure vessel wall. 
c. The peak vessel wall fluence for the design life of the plant is less 
than 1020 n/cm2 for neutrons of energy greater than 1 MeV. If the peak 
fluence is found to be greater than this value, the reviewers of SRP 
Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 are notified. 
(please press Space to continue)'). 
end. 
topic 'll . D Evaluation Finding'. 
say (' 
4.3.IV Evaluation Finding 
The reviewer verifies that sufficient information has been provided and his 
review supports the following type of evaluation finding, which is to be 
included in the staff' 's safety evaluation report: 
The applicant has described the computer programs and calculational tech-
niques used to predict the nuclear characteristics of the reactor design 
and has provided examples to demonstrate the ability of these methods to 
predict experimental results. The staff concludes that the informa4ion 
presented adequately demonstrates the ability of these analysis to pre-
dict reactivity and physics characteristics of the--------------- plant. 
To allow for changes of reactivity due to reactor heatup, changes in ope-
rating conditions, fuel burnup, and fission product buildup, a signifi-
cant amount of excess reactivity is designed into the core. The applicant 
has provided substantial information relating to core reactivity require-
ments for the first cycle and has shown that means have been incorporated 
into the design to control excess reactivity at all times. The applicant 
has shown that sufficient control rod worth is available to shut down the 
reactor with at least a ______ %Wk/ k subcritical margin in the hot condi-
tion at any time during the cycle with the highest worth control rod 
stuck in the fully withdrawn position. 
On the basis of our review, we conclude that the applicant''s assessment 
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of reactivity control requirements over the first core cycle is suitably 
conservative, and that adequate negative worth has been provided by the 
control requirements will be reviewed for additional cycles as this in-
formation becomes available. 
The staff concludes that the nuclear design is acceptable and meets the 
requirements of GDC 10, 11, 12, 13, 20, 25, 26, 27, and 28. This conclu-
sion is based on the following: 
1. The applicant has met the requirements of GDC 11 with respect to 
prompt inherent nuclear feedback characteristics in the power opera-
ting range by: 
a. Calculating a negative Doppler coefficient of reactivit y , and 
b. Using calculational methods that have been found acceptable. 
The staff has reviewed the Doppler reactivity coefficients in this 
case and found them to be suitably conservative. 
2. The applicant has met the requirements of GDC 12 with respect to power 
oscillations which could result in conditions exceeding specified 
acceptable fuel design limits by: 
a. Showing that such power oscillations are not possible and/ or can be 
easily detected and thereby remedied, and 
b. Using calculational methods that have been found acceptable. 
The staff has reviewed the analysis of these power oscillations in 
this case and found them to be suitably conservative. 
3. The applicant has met the requirements of GDC 13 with respect to pro-
vision of instrumentation and controls to monitor variables and sys-
tems that can affect the fission process by: 
a. Providing instrumentation and systems to monitor the core power 
distribution, control rod positions and patterns, and other process 
variables such as temperature and pressure, and 
b. Providing suitable alarms and/or control room indications for these 
monitored variables. 
4. The applicant has met the requirements of GDC 26 with respect to pro-
vision of two independent reactivity control systems of different de-
sign by: 
a. Having a system than can reliably control anticipated operational 
occurrences, 
b. Having a system that can hold the core subcritical under cold con-
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ditions, and 
c. Having a system that can control planned, normal power changes . 
5. The applicant has met the requirements of GDC 27 with respect to reac-
tivity control systems that have a combined capability in conjunction 
with poison addition by the emergency core cooling system of reliably 
controlling reactivity changes under postulated accident conditions 
by: 
a. Providing a movable control rod system and a liquid poison system, 
and 
b . Performing calculations to demonstrate that the core has sufficient 
shutdown margin with the highest worth stuck rod. 
6. The applicant has met the requirements of GDC 28 with respect to pos-
tul ated reactivity accidents by (reviewed by CPB under SRP Sections 
15.4.8 or 15.4.9): 
a. Meetings the regulatory position in Regulatory Guide 1.77 for PWRs, 
b. Meeting the fuel enthalpy limit of 280 cal/ gm for BWRs (same as for 
PWRs), 
c. Meeting the criteria on the capability to cool the core, and 
d. Using calculational methods that have been found acceptable for 
reactivity insertion accidents. 
7 . The applicant has met the requirements of GDC 10, 20, and 25 with res-
pect to specified acceptable fuel design limits by providing analyses 
demonstrating: 
a. That normal operation, including the effects of anticipated opera-
tional occurrences, have met fuel design criteria, 
b. That the automatic initiation of the reactivity control system 
assures that fuel design criteria are not exceeded as a result of 
anticipated operational occurrences and assures the automatic ope-
ration of systems and components important to safety under accident 
conditions, and 
c. That no single malfunction of the reactivity control system causes 
violation of the fuel design limits. 
(please press Space to continue)'). 
end. 
topic 'II.E Implementation '. 
say (' 
4.3.V Implementation 
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The following is intended to provide guidance to applicants and licensees re-
garding the NRC staff' 's plans for using this SRP section. 
Except in those cases in which the applicant proposes an acceptable alterna-
tive method for complying with specified portions of the Commission' ' s regula-
tions, the method described here in will be used by the staff in its evalua-
tion of conformance with Commission regulations. 
(please press Space to continue)') . 
end . 
topic 'II.F References '. 
say (' 
4.3.VI References 
1 . _10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 10, "Reactor Design"; 
Criterion 11, "React or Inherent Protection"; Criterion 12, "Suppression of 
Reactor Power Oscillations"; Criterion 13, " Instrumentation and Control" ; 
Criterion 20, "Protection System Functions"; Criterion 25, "Pr otection Sys-
tem Requirements for Reactivity Control Malfunctions",; Criterion 26, 
"Reactivity Control System Redundancy and Capability"; Criterion 27, "Com-
bined Reactivity Control Systems Capability"; and Criterion 28, "Reactivit y 
Limits". 
2. Branch Technical Position CPB 4.3-1 , "Westinghouse Constant Axial Offset 
Control", July 1975, attached to SRP Section 4.3. 
3. R. 0. Meyer, "The Analys is of Fuel Densification", NUREG-0085, J ul y 1976. 
4. M. K. Drake, ed., "Data Formats and Procedures for the ENDF Neutron Cross 
Section Library", BNL-50274 (ENDF-102), National Neutron Cross Section 
Center, Brookhaven National Laborator y ( 1970) . 
(please press Space to continue) ') . 
end. 
topic ' II.G Appendix '. 
say(' 
4.3.VII Appendix 
BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION CPB 4 . 3-1 
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WESTINGHOUSE CONSTANT AXIAL OFFSET CONTROL (CAOC) 
A. BACKGROUND 
In connection with the staff review of WCAP-8185 (17x17), we reviewed and 
accepted a scheme developed by Westinghouse for operating reactors that assu-
res that throughout the core cycle including during the most limiting power 
maneuvers the total peaking factor, FQ, will not exceed the value consistent 
with the LOCA or other limiting accident analysis. This operating scheme, cal-
led constant axial offset control (CAOC), involves maintaining the axial flux 
difference within a narrow tolerance band around a burnup-dependent target in 
an attempt to minimize the variation of the axial distribution of xenon during 
plant maneuvers. 
Originally (early 1974), the maximum allowable FQ (for LOCA) was 2.5 or grea-
ter. Later (late 1974), when needed changes were made to the ECCS evaluation 
model, Westinghouse, in order to meet physics analysis commitment to all its 
customers at virtually the same time, did a generic analysis (one designed to 
suit a spectrum of operating and soon-to-be-operating reac4ors) and showed 
that most plants could meet the requirements of Appendix K and 10 CFR 50.46 
(i.e., 2200F peak clad temperature) if FQ F 2.32. Also, Westinghouse showed 
that CAOC procedures employing a +- 5/. target band would limit peak FQ for 
each of these reactors to less than 2.32 . 
We recognized at that time, however, that not all plants needed to maintain FQ 
below 2.32 to meet FAC, or needed to operate within a +- 5/. band to achieve FQ 
F 2.32. In fact, Point Beach was allowed to operate with a wider band because 
the Wisconsin Electric Power Company demonstrated to our satisfaction that the 
reactors could be maneuvered within a wider band (+6,-9/.) and still hold FQ 
below 2.32. We fully expected that in time most plants would have individual 
CAOC analyses and procedures tailored to the requirements of their plant-spe-
cif ic ECCS analyses. 
Therefore, when we accepted CAOC it was not just FQ = 2.32 and +- 5/. band width 
we were approving, but the CAOC methodology . This is analogous to our review 
and approval of ECCS and fuel performance evaluation models. 
The CAOC methodology, which is described in Reference 1, entails (1) establis-
hing an envelope of allowed power shapes and power densities, (2) devising an 
operating strategy for the cycle which maximizes plant flexibilit y (maneuve-
ring) and minimizes axial power shape changes, (3) demonstrating that this 
strategy will not result in core conditions that violate the envelope of per-
missible core power characteristics, and (4) demonstrating that this power 
distribution control scheme can be effectively supervised with excore detec-
tors. 
Westinghouse argues that point 3, above, is achieved by calculating all of the 
load-follow maneuvers planned for the proposed cycle and showing that the ma-
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ximu.rn power densities expected are within limits. These calculations are per-
formed with a radial / axial systhesis method which has been shown to predict 
conservative power densities when compared to experiment. While we have accep-
ted CAOC on the basis of these analyses, we have also required that power dis-
tributions be measured throughout a number of representative (frequently, li-
miting) maneuvers early in cycle life to confirm that peaking factors are no 
greater than predicted. 
Additionally, we are sponsoring a series of calculations at BNL to check as-
pects of the Westinghouse analysis. 
The power distribution measurement tests described above will, of course, au-
tomatically relate incore and excore detector responses, and thereby validate 
that power distribution control can be managed with excore detectors. 
B. BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION 
An applicant or licensee proposing CAOC for other than FQ = 2.32 and WI = +-5% 
is expected to provide: 
1. Analyses of FQ x power fraction showing the maximum FQ (z) at power levels 
up to 100% and DNB performance with allowed axial shapes relative to the 
design bases for overpower and loss of flow transients. The envelope of 
these analyses must be shown to be valid for all normal operating modes and 
anticipated reactor conditions. (See Table 1 of References 2 for the cases 
which must be analyzed to form such an envelope.) 
2. A description of the codes used, h ow cross-sections for cycle were deter-
mined, and what Fxy values were used . 
3. A commitment to perform load- follow tests wherein FQ is determined by ta-
king incore maps during the transient. (NOTE: Wes tinghouse has outlined for 
both the NRC staff and the ACRS an augmented startup test program designed 
to confirm experimentally the predicted power shapes. This program is pre-
sented in a Westinghouse report (Ref. 3). The tests will be carried out at 
several representative--both 15x15 and 17x17-- reactors. We have endorsed 
these tests as has the ACRs in its June 12, 1975 letter f or the Diablo 
Canyon plant. In addition, for the near term we plan to require that those 
licensees who propose to depart from the previously approved peaking factor 
and target band width perform similar tests, precisely which ones to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis , to broaden our confidence in analytical 
methods b y extending the comparison of prediction with measurement to inc-
lude more and more burnup histories. 
C. REFERENCES 
1. T. Morita, et al., "Power Distribution Control and Load Following Procedu-
res", WC AP-8385 (proprietary) and WCAP-8403 (nonproprietary), Westinghouse 
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Electric Corporation, September 1974 . 
2 . C. Eicheldinger , Westinghouse Electric Corporation, letter to D. B. Vassalo, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulator y Commission, July 16, 1975 . 
3. K. A. Jones, et al. , "Augmented Startup and Cyc l e 1 Physi cs Program", WCAP-
8575 , Westinghouse Electric Corporation, August 1975 . 
(please press Space t o c ontinue)'). 
end . 
t opic ' III Thermal and Hydraulic Design '. 
ask (' 
4 . 4 THERMAL AND HYDRAULIC DESIGN 
REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES 
Primary - Core Perfor manc e Branch (C PB ) 
Secondary - Instrumentation and Control System Branch (ICSB ) 
Human Fact ors Engineering Branch ( HFEB ) 
Procedures and Tes t Review Branch ( PTRB ) 
(please c lick on your choi ce) 
This part c ontains :' , part , 
[ 
'4 . 4 . I Areas of Review', 
'4. 4 . II Acceptance Criteria ', 
'4 .4 . III Review Procedures ' , 
'4. 4.IV Evaluation Findings', 
'4. 4 . V Implemetation ' , 
' 4.4.VI References' , 
'Content ', 
' Index ', 
' Opening Menu ' ] ). 
do ( ?part ) . 
end . 
t opic ' III . A Areas of Review'. 
s ay (' 
4 .4.I Areas of Review 
The objectives of the review are to confirm that t he t hermal and hydraulic de -
sign of the core and the reactor coo lant s ys tem (RCS) has been accomplished 
using acceptable analytical methods; is equivalent t o or i s a j ustified extra-
polation from proven designs; provides acceptable margins of safet y from con-
ditions which would lead t o fuel damage during nor mal react or operat ion and 
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anticipated operational transients; and is not susceptible to thermal-hydrau-
lic design, i.e., that for a plant similar in core and primary coolant system 
design to previously reviewed plants. The review of new prototype plants, new 
CHF or CPR correlations, and new analysis methods require that additional in-
dependent audit analyses be performed. The required analyses may be in the 
following form: 
1. Independent computer calculations to substantiate reactor vendor analyses. 
2. Reduction and correlations of experimental data to verify processes or phe-
nomena which are applied to reactor design. 
3. Independent comparisons and correlations are made of data from experimental 
programs. These reviews also include analyses of experimental techniques, 
test repeatability, and data reduction methods. 
The review includes evaluation of the proposed technical specifications regar-
ding safety limits and limiting safety settings, to ascertain that these are 
consistent with the power-flow operating map for boiling water reactor (BWR) 
plants or the temperature-power operating map for pressurized water reactor 
(PWR) plants. 
The review also includes determination of the largest hydraulic loads on core 
and reactor coolant system components during normal operation and postulated 
accident conditions. This information is used in the review of fuel holddown 
requirements. 
To accomplish the objectives, the reviewer examines features of core and RCS 
components, key process variables for the coolant system, calculated parame-
ters characterizing thermal performance, data serving to support new correla-
tions or changes in accepted correlations, and assumptions in the equations 
and solution techniques used in the analyses. The reviewer determines that the 
applicant has used approved analysis methods in the manner specified by topi-
cal reports describing the methods and by staff reports approving the methods. 
the analysis methods addressed are to include core thermal-hydraulic calcula-
tions to establish local coolant conditions, departure from nucleate boiling 
or boiling transition calculations, and thermal-hydraulic stability evaluati-
on. If an applicant has used previously unapproved correlations or analysis 
methods, the reviewer initiates an evaluation, either generic or plant speci-
fic. Any changes to accepted codes, correlations, and analytical procedures, 
or the addition of new ones must be reviewed to determine that they are justi-
fied on theoretical or empirical grounds. 
A secondary review is performed by ICSB, HFEB, and PTRB. ICSB will review the 
functional performance and requirements for Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC) mo-
nitoring system hardware. Emergency procedure guidelines and the information 
display will be reviewed by PTRB and HFEB, respectively. The results of these 
reviews will be used by CPB to complete the overall evaluation of the thermal-
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hydraulic review and will be incorporated into the Safety Evaluation Report 
(SER). 
The review of power distribution assumption made for the core thermal and hy-
draulic analysis is coordinated with the review for core physics calculations, 
as described in the Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 4 . 3, for consistency . 
The reviewer verifies that core monitoring techniques which rely on in-core or 
ex-core neutron sensor inputs are reviewed . 
(please press Space to continue)'). 
end. 
topic 'III.B Acceptance Criteria' . 
say (' 
4.4.II Acceptance Criteria 
The CPB acceptance criteria are based meeting the relevant requirements of 
General Design Criterion 10 (Ref. 1), as it relates to the reactor core being 
designed, with appropriate margin to assure that specified acceptable fuel de-
sign limits are not exceeded during normal operation or anticipated operatio-
nal occurrences (AOO) . 
Specific criteria necessary to meet the requirements of GDC 10 are as follow: 
1. SRP Section 4.2 specifies the acceptance criteria for evaluation of fuel 
design limits. One of the criteria provides assurances that there be at 
least a 95% probability at a 95% confidence level that the hot fuel rod in 
the core does not experience a departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) or 
transition condition during normal operation or anticipated operational oc-
currence. 
Uncertainties in the values of process parameters, core design parameters, 
and calculational methods used in the assessment of thermal margin should 
be treated with at least a 95% probability at a 95% confidence level . 
Two examples of acceptable approaches to meet this criterion are: 
a. For departure from nucleate boiling ration (DNBR), critical heat flux 
ratio (CHFR) or critical power ratio (CPR) correlations there should be 
at 95% probability at the 95% confidence level, that the hot rod in the 
core does not experience a departure from nucleate boiling or boiling 
transition condition during normal operation or anticipated operational 
occurrences; or 
b. For DNBR, CHFR or CPR correlations, the limiting (minimum) value of 
DNBR, CHFR, of CPR is to be established such that at least 99.9% of the 
fuel rods in the core would not be expected to experience departure from 
nucleate boiling or boiling transition during normal operation or anti-
118 
cipated operational occurrences. 
Correlations of critical heat flux are continually being revised as a re-
sult of additional experimental data, changes in fuel assembly design, and 
improved c alculational techniques involving coolant mixing and the effect 
of axial power distributions . As guidance to the reviewer, the correlations 
listed below have been found acceptable for previously reviewed plants. 
a. BWRs - The value of the minimum CPR calculated with the GETAB analysis 
(Ref. 2) will vary for different plants and/or fuel types. Typical va-
lues are 1 .06 and 1 .07 . 
b . PWRs - The value of the minimum DNBR calculated with due allowance for 
mixing grids (Refs. 3,4 , and 5) is typically 1 .30 using the BAW-2 cor-
relation (Ref. 6) or the W-3 correlation (Ref. 7). Much lower values, 
depending upon the test data base and fuel design, are acceptable for 
more recent correlations such as the WRB-1, CE-1, and BWC. 
2. Problems affecting DNBR or CPR limits, such as fuel densifi cation or r od 
bowing , are accounted for by an appropriate design penalty which is deter-
mined experimentally or analytically. Subchannel hydraulic analys is codes 
such as those described in References 8 and 9, should be used to calculate 
l ocal fluid conditions within fuel assemblies for use in PWR DNB correla-
tions. The ac ceptability of such codes must be demonstrated by measurements 
made in large lattice experiments or power reactor cores . The effects of 
radial pressure gradients in the core flow distribution should be evalua-
ted. Calculations of BWR fluid conditions fo r use in CHF correlations have 
been in accordance with the models specified in Reference 10 and 11. 
3. The reactor should be demonstrated to have suffic ient margin to be free of 
undamped oscillations and other thermal- hydraulic instabilities for all 
conditions of steady-state operation (including part loop operation), and 
for antic ipated operational occurrences. 
4. Methods f or cal culating single-phase and two-phase fluid flow in the reac-
tor vessel and other components should include c lassical fluid mechanics 
relationships and appropriate empirical correlations . For components of un-
usual geometry, such as the f ollowing, these relationships should be con-
firmed empirically, using representative data bases from approved reports 
of the t ype listed below. 
a. React or vessel (Ref . 12). 
b . · Jet pump (Ref . 13). 
c . Core flow distribution (Refs . 12 and 14). 
5 . The proposed technical specifications should be established such that t he 
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plant can be safely operated at steady state conditions under all of the 
expected combinations of system parameters . The safety limits and limiting 
safety settings must be established for each parameter, or combinations of 
parameters, such that acceptance criterion 1, above, is satisfied . 
6. Preoperational and initial startup test programs should follow the recom-
mendations of Regulatory Guide 1 . 68 (Ref . 15), as regards measurements, and 
confirmation of thermal hydraulic design aspects. 
7 . The design description and proposed procedures for use of the loose part 
monitoring system should be consistent with the requirements of Regulatory 
Guide 1 . 133 (Ref. 16). 
8. The effects of crud should be accounted for in the thermal- hydraulic design 
by including it in the CHF calculations in the core or in the pressure drop 
throughout the RCS . Process monitoring provisions should assure capability 
for detection of a three percent pressure drop in the reactor coolant flow. 
The flow should be monitored every 24 hours. 
9. Instrumentation provided for an unambiguous indication of ICC, such as pri-
mary coolant saturation meters in PWRs, reactor vessel measurement systems, 
and core exit thermocouples, should meet the design requirements described 
in item II.F.2 NUREG-0718 (Ref. 17) and NUREG-0737 (Ref . 18) . Procedures 
for detection and recovery from conditions of ICC must be consistent with 
technical guidelines that incorporate response predictions based on appro-
priate analyses . 
(please press Space to continue)'). 
end. 
topic ' III.C Review Procedures ' . 
say (' 
4.4.III Review Procedures 
The procedures below are used during the construction permit (CP) review to 
assure that the design criteria and bases and the preliminary design as set 
forth in the preliminary safety analysis report meet the acceptance criteria 
given in section II of this SRP section . For operating license (OL) applica-
tions, the procedures are utilized to verify that the initial design criteria 
and bases have been appropriately implemented in the final design as set forth 
in the final safety analysis report. The OL review also includes the proposed 
technical specifications, to assure that they are adequate in regard to safety 
limits, limiting safety system settings, and conditions of operation . 
The reviewer must begin with an understanding of currently acceptable thermal 
and hydraulic design practice for the reactor type under review. This under-
standing can be most readily gained from topical reports describing CHF corre-
lations, system hydraulic models and tests, and core subchannel analysis met-
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hods; from standard texts and other technical literature which establish the 
methodology and the nomenclature of this technology; and from documents which 
summarize current staff pos itions concerning acceptable design methods. 
Huch of the review described below is generic in nature and is not performed 
for each plant . That is, the CPB reviewer is to compare the core design and 
operating parameters to those of previously reviewed plants. He then devotes 
the major portion of his review effort to those areas where the application is 
not identical to previ ously reviewed plants . 
The reviewer is to compare the information in the applicant''s safety analysis 
report (SAR) to the documents referenced by the applicant or in this SRP Sec-
tion t o determine conf ormance to the bounds established by such documents. The 
reviewer must confirm that void, pressure drop, and heat transfer correlations 
used t o estimate fluid conditions (flow, pressure, quality) are within the 
ranges of applicability specified by their authors or i n previous staff revi-
ews, that the analysis methods are used in the manner specified by the develo-
pers or in previou s staff rev iews, that the reactor design falls within the 
ranges of applicability specified for accepted analysis methods , and that the 
design is within the criteria specified in II, above, and is not an unexplai-
ned or unwarranted extrapolation of other thermal-hydraulic des igns . 
The review does not routinely involve calculations by the staff . However, the 
reviewer should ensure that those applications based on statistical design 
methodologies include the coefficients require by the statistical model and 
define the parameter ranges for which the coefficients are applicable . Unc er-
tainties in computer codes , correlat i ons , design methods , and set point metho-
dol ogies should be quantif ied and the method (s) of accounting for these uncer -
tainties in the design procedure s should be discussed. For example the sensi-
tivity fact ors and their ranges of applicability must be reviewed for those 
plants utilizi ng the Westinghouse "Improved Thermal Design Procedure ", (Ref . 
19 ) . On occasion, e.g., if a new design or new design method is proposed, in-
dependent analyses are performed by the staff or by consultant under the di-
rection of CPS. These analyses verif y the design or establish the range of ap-
plicability and associated accuracy of the new method and the reviewer ensures 
it is applied accordingly. 
The reviewer is t o establish that the thermal-hydraulic design and its charac-
terization by HCHFR or DNBR have been accomplished and are presented in a man-
ner which account s for all poss ible reactor operating states as determined 
from operating maps. In this regard, the reviewer must confir m that the power 
distribution assumptions of SAR Section 4.4 are a conservative (i.e., worst-
case) accounting of the power distributions derived in SAR Section 4.3 fr om 
core physics analyses, and that the latter analyses include an acceptable cal-
culation of local void fractions. He must also confirm that the mass flux used 
in these calculat ions takes into account the core flow distribution (including 
that f or partial loop operat ion) and the worst case of core bypass flow. The 
reviewer confirms that the primary coolant flow range shown in the operating 
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map will be verified by prestartup measurements . 
The reviewer ensures that adequat e account i s taken of t he effect of crud in 
the primary coolant s ystem, such as i n the calculation of CHF in the core , 
heat transfer in the steam generator s , and pressure drop throughout the RCS . 
The reviewer is t o examine the c alculation of hydraulic l oads for normal ope-
rations, including anticipated transients, to ens ure the y are properly estima -
ted for the worst cases . Worst c ase h ydraulic l oads f or nor mal operations are 
t o be provided f or use in the analysis of lifti ng f or ce of the fuel (SRP Sec -
tion 4.2). CPB will also provide consultation t o RSB upon request , regarding 
calculations f or pos tulated acc ident conditions. MEB reviews the adequacy of 
components and structures under acc ident l oads (SRP Section 3 .9.2) and CPB de-
termines that a coolable core geometry i s maintained (SRP Section 4 .2). 
The reviewer should ensure that an adequate loose parts monitoring system i s 
provided. At the CP level , the design criteria for t he s ystem and the t ypes, 
locations, and method s of mounting all intended sensors should be reviewed . 
The reviewer should compare the de s i gn t o Regulat or y Guide 1.33 and to equip-
ment used and applicat ion experience on comparable plant s. 
At the OL level; a more complete descr i ption of the s ys tem includi ng s ens it i -
vity specifications and operating procedures should be reviewed. The re viewer 
should ensure that operating procedures and training provisions are adequate 
to fully utilize the system potential f or loose parts detection. The Operator 
Licensing Branch (OLB ) will provide consultation on s taff training in accor-
dance with the SRP Section 13.2. 
The reviewer should re view the vibration monitoring equipment and procedures 
t o ensure that the monitoring provisions are adequate f or t he plant under re-
view based on experience with compar able plants . The CPB will evaluate the ap-
plication of neutron monitoring sensors for core vibration test analysis. The 
MEB is responsible in SRP Secti on 3. 9 . 2, and provides technical consultation 
to CPB on the need f or permanent vibration monitoring provisions f or the plant 
under review. 
The reviewer ensures that applicants have an acceptabl e program f or i ncorpora-
tion of ins trumentati on and procedures f or detection and re covery fr om condi-
tions of inadequate core cooling. At t he CP stage, the appl icant must provide 
preliminary design information on selected instrumentation components and must 
specify the design c oncept selected f or development instrumentation in accor -
dance with the requirement of i tem II.F . 2 of NUREG-0718 (Ref . 17 ) . 
At the OL s tage , the reviewer ensures that the applicant i s in c ompl i ance with 
the documentati on requirement s and des ign requirements described in i tem 
II . F.2 of NUREG-0737 (Ref. 18). The reviewer consults with ICSB and HFEB con-
cerning the design acc eptability of the instrumentation and displays with the 
Reactor Sys tems Branch (RSB) and PTRB concerning the acceptabi l i t y of guideli-
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nes and procedures for recognition and response to inadequate core cooling 
conditions. 
The applicant ' 's proposed preoperational and initial startup test programs are 
reviewed to determine that they are consistent with the intent of Regulatory 
Guide 1 . 68 (Ref. 15). At the OL stage, the reviewer is to assure that suffici-
ent information is provided by the applicant to identify clearly the test ob-
jectives, methods of testing, and acceptance criteria. (See part C.2.b of Re-
ference 15). 
The test scope should include verification of any safety analysis codes or 
methods which could affect the thermal-hydraulic evaluations and which have 
not been previously verified. The initial startup test should also include a 
description of plans for a signature analysis to determine alarm setting for 
the loose parts monitoring system, and a description of test programs for eva-
luation, qualification and calibration of ICC instrumentation . 
The reviewer evaluates the proposed test programs to determine if they provide 
reasonable assurance that the core and reactor coolant system will satisfy 
functional requirements . As an alternative to this detailed evaluation, the 
reviewer may compare the core and reactor coolant system design to that of 
preyiously reviewed plants. If the design is essentially identical and if the 
proposed test programs are essentially the same as performed previously on 
other plants, the reviewer may conclude that the proposed test programs are 
adequate for the core and reactor coolant system. 
If the core the reactor coolant s ystem differs significantly from that of pre-
viously reviewed designs, the impac t of the proposed changes on the preopera-
tional and initial startup testing programs are reviewed at the construction 
permit stage. This effort should particularly evaluate the need for any speci-
al design features required t o perform acceptable test programs. 
The proposed technical specifications that relate to the core and the reactor 
coolant system are evaluated. This evaluation is to cover all of the safety 
limits and bases that could affect the thermal and hydraulic performance of 
the core. The limiting safety system settings are reviewed to ascertain that 
acceptable margins exist between the values att which reactor trip occurs 
automatically for each parameter (or combinations of parameters) and the sa-
fety limits. The reviewer confirms that the limiting .safety s ystem settings 
and limiting conditions for operation, as they relate to the reactor coolant 
system, do not permit operation with any expected combination of parameters 
that would not satisfy criterion 1 of section II . For example, the limiting 
condition of operation must assure that the reactor coolant pumps have adequ-
ate net positive suction head all expected modes of operation . 
(please press Space to continue )' ). 
end. 
t opic ' III . D Evaluation Findings '. 
s ay (' 
4 .4. IV Evaluation Findings 
123 
The reviewer verifies that the SAR contains suffic ient information and his re-
view supports the follo wing kinds of statement s and con clusions, which should 
be included in the staff' ' s safety evaluation report . The following paragraph 
is applicable to both a CP and OL : 
The thermal-hydraulic design of the core f or the --------- plant was revi-
ewed . The s cope of review inc luded the design criteria, preliminary cor e 
design, and the steady state analysis of the core thermal-hydraul i c per-
f or mance . (For an DL review thi s sentence should be modified t o i nc lude 
the implementation of the design criteri a as repre sented by t he final core 
design .) The review c oncentrat ed on the difference s between t he proposed 
core de s ign (and criteria) and those des i gns and criteria that have been 
previ ous l y reviewed and f ound a cceptabl e by the s taff . It wa s f ound t ha t 
all s uch differences were satisfact or ily j us tif i ed by the applicant. The 
applicant ' ' s thermal-hydraulic analyses were performed using analytical 
methods and correlations that have been previ ous l y reviewed by the s t aff 
and f ound acceptable. 
For a CP, the f ollowing conclusion s should be made : 
The staff concludes that the thermal- hydraulic design of t he core meets 
the requirements of General Design Criterion 10, 10 CFR Part 50 . The core 
has been de s igned with appropriate margin t o assure that acceptable f uel 
design limits are not exceeded during steady-state operation or anticipa-
ted operational occurrences . This conclus i on i s based on the appli cant' 's 
analyses of the core thermal-hydrauli c performanc e which was reviewed by 
the staff and f ound to be acceptable . The applicant will establi sh a pre-
operational and initial startup test program in accordance wi t h Regulator y 
Guide 1 .68 t o measure and confirm t he thermal- hydraulic design as-
pe c t s. The l oose parts and vibration monitoring system is designed f or 
complianc e with the requirements of Regulator y Guide 1 . 133 and the 
instrumentation f or the detection of inadequate core cooling i s in compli-
ance with the requirements of item II . F .2 of NUREG-0718. 
For an DL appli cation , the f ollowing t ypes of conc lusions should be supported . 
The staff concludes that the t hermal-hydraulic design of the core meets 
the requirements of General Design Criterion 10, 10 CFR Part 50 and i s 
ac ceptable f or final design approval . We also conclude that the reactor 
core has been designed with appropriate margin t o assure that the reac t or 
fuel des ign limits are not exc eeded during steady-state operation or anti -
cipated operational oc currence s and that the react or will perfor m i ts s a-
f ety funct ions throughout its des i gn lifet i me under all modes of operati-
on . This conclusion is bas ed on t he applicant ''s analyses of the core 
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thermal-hydraulic performance which was re viewed by the staff and foW1d to 
be acceptable. The applicant has committed to a preoperational and initial 
startup test program in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.68 to mea-
sure and confirm the thermal-hydraulic design aspects. The staff has revi-
ewed the applicant ''s preoperational and initial startup test program and 
has concluded that it is acceptable . We also conclude that the loose parts 
monitoring program is designed for compliance with the requirements of 
Regulatory Guide 1.133, and is, therefore, acceptable. We have reviewed 
the instrumentation for the detection of inadequate core cooling and con-
cluded that it is in compliance wi th the acquirements of Item II.F.2 of 
NUREG-0737 and is acceptable. 
(please press Space t o continue)'). 
end. 
t opic ' III.E Implementation '. 
say (' 
4.4.V Implementation 
The following is intended to provide guidance t o applicants and licensees re-
garding the NRC staff' ' s plan for using this SRP section. 
Except in those cases which the applicant proposes an acceptable alternative 
method for complying with specified portions of the Commission' 's regulations, 
the method described herein will be used by the staff in its evaluation of 
conformance with Commission regulations. 
Implementation schedules for conformance t o parts of the method discussed he-
rein are contained in the referenced regulatory guides and NUREGs. 
(please press Space to continue)'). 
end. 
topic 'III. F References '. 
say (' 
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(please press Space to continue)') . 
end. 
topic 'Criterion 10 ' . 
window () . 
say (' 
Criterion 10 - Reactor Design 
The reactor core and associated coolant, control, and protection 
systems shall be designed with appropriate margin to assure that 
specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded during 
any condition of normal operation, including the effects of 
anticipated operational occurrences.'). 
close_window (). 
end . 
topic 'GDC 27 and 35'. 
do ('Criterion 27') and do ('Criterion 35'). 
end. 
topic 'Criterion 27'. 
window (). 
say (' 
Criterion 27 - Combined Reactivity Control Sys tems Capability 
The reactivity control s ystems shall be designed to have a 
combined capabil ity, in conjunction with poison addition by the 
emergency core coo ling system, of reliably controlling reacti-
vity changes to assure that under postulated accidents conditi -
ons and with appropriate margin for stuck rods the capability to 
cool the core is maintained.'). 
close_window (). 
end. 
topic 'Criterion 35'. 
window (). 
say (' 
Criterion 35 - Emergency core cooling 
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A system to provide abundant emergency core cooling to provide 
abundant emergency core cooling shall be provided. The system 
safety function shall be to transfer heat from the reactor core 
following any loss of reactor coolant at a rate such that (1 ) 
fuel and clad damage that could interfere with continued effec-
tive core cooling is prevented and (2) clad metal-water reaction 
is limited t o negligible amounts. 
Suitable redundancy in components and features , and suitable 
interconnections, leak detection, isolation, and containment 
capabilities shall be provided to assure that for onsite electric 
power system operation (assuming onsite p ower is not available) 
the system safety function can be accomplished, assuming a 
single failure .'). 
close_window (). 
end . 
t opic ' General Design Criteria 27 and 35' . 
do ('Criterion 27') and do ('Cri terion 35'). 
end. 
topic ' General Design Cr i teria 10, 27, and 35 '. 
do ('Criterion 10') and do ('Criterion 27 ') and do ('Criterion 35'). 
end. 
topic ' General Design 2'. 
window(). 
say (' 
Criterion 2 - Design Bases for Protection against Natural 
Phenomena 
Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be 
designed to withstand the effect of natural phenomena such as 
earthquakes , t ornadoes, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and se iches 
without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. The 
design bases f or these structures, systems, and components shall 
reflect: (1) Approriate consideration of the most severe of the 
natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the 
site and surrounding area, with sufficient margin for the limited 
accuracy, quantity, and period of time in which the historical 
data have been accumulated, (2) appropriate combinations of the 
effects of normal and accident conditions with the effects of t he 
natural phenomena and (3) the importance of the safety funct i ons 
to be performed.') . 
close_window (). 
end. 
topic 'Criterion 11'. 
window(). 
say (' 
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Criterion 11 - React or Inherent Protection 
The reactor core and associated coolant systems shall be designed 
so that in the power operating range the net effect of the prompt 
inherent nuclear feedback charac teristics tends to compensate for 
a rapid increase in reactivity.') . 
close_window (). 
end. 
topic 'Criterion 12 '. 
window (). 
say (' 
Criterion 12 - Suppression of Reactor Power Oscillations 
The reactor core and associated coolant, control, and protec t ion 
s ystems shall be designed to assure that power oscillations which 
can result in conditions exceeding specified acceptable fuel de-
sign limits are not possible or can be reliably and readily detec-
ted and suppressed.'). 
close _window (). 
end. 
topic 'Criterion 13'. 
window(). 
say (' 
Criterion 13 - Instrumentation and control 
Instrumentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systems 
over their anticipated ranges f or normal operation, for anticipated 
operational occurrences, and f or accident conditions as appropriate 
to assure adequate safety , including those variables and systems 
that can affect the fission proccess, the integrity of the reactor 
core, the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment 
and its associated s ystems. Appropr iat e controls shall be provided 
to maintain these variables and systems within prescribed operating 
ranges.') . 
close_window (). 
end. 
topic 'Criterion 20'. 
window(). 
say (' 
Criterion 20 - Protection System Functions 
The protection system shall be designed (1) to initiate automati-
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cally the operation of appropriate systems including the reactivity 
control systems, to assure that specified acceptable fuel design 
limits are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational 
occurrences and (2) to sense accident conditions and to initiate 
the operation of systems and components important to safety.'). 
close_window (). 
end . 
topic 'Criterion 25'. 
window () . 
say (' 
Criterion 25 - Protection System Requirements for Reactivity 
Control Malfunctions. 
The protection system shall be designed to assure that specified 
acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded for any single mal-
function of the reactivity control systems, such as accidental 
withdrawn (not ejection or dropout) of control ro$s. ' ). 
close_ window 0 .. 
end. 
top ic 'Criterion 26'. 
window (). 
say (' 
Criterion 26 - Reactivity Control System Redundancy and Capability 
Two independent reactivity control systems of different design 
principles shall be provided. One of the systems shall use control 
rods, preferably including a positive means for inserting the rods, 
and shall be capable of reliably controlling reactivity changes to 
assure that under conditions of normal operation, including anti-
cipated operational occurrences, and with appropriate margin for 
malfunctions such as stuck rods, specified acceptable fuel design 
limits are not exceeded. The second reactivity control system shall 
be capable of reliably controlling the rate of reactivity changes 
(including xenon burnout) to assure acceptable fuel design limits 
are not exceeded. One of the systems shall be capable of holding the 
reactor core subcritical under cold conditions.'). 
close_window () . 
end . 
topic 'Criterion 28 ' . 
window (). 
say ( ' 
Criterion 28 - Reactivity Limits 
The reactivity control systems shall be designed with appropriate 
limits on the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase to 
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assure that the effects of postulated reactivity accidents can 
neither (1) result in damage to the reactor coolant pressure boun-
dary greater than limited local yielding nor (2) sufficiently dis-
turb the core, its support structures or other reactor pressure 
vessel internals to impair significantly the capability to cool the 
core. These postulated reactivity accidents shall include conside-
ration of rod ejection (unless prevented by positive means), rod 
dropout, steam line rupture, changes in reactor coolant temperature 
and pressure, and cold water addition.'). 
close_window (). 
end . 
topic 'General Design Criteria 10, 11, 12, 13, 20, 25, 26, 27, and 28'. 
do ('Criterion 10') and do ('Criterion 11') and do ('Criterion 12') and do 
('Criterion 13') and do ('Criterion 20') and do ('Criterion 25 ' ) and do 
('Criterion 26') and do ('Criterion 27') and do ('Criterion 28'). 
end. 
topic 'SRP Section 4.3'. 
do ('4.3 Nuclear Design'). 
end. 
topic 'SRP Section 4.4'. 
do ('4.4 Thermal and Hydraulic Design'). 
end . 
end. 
/ 
